Technical Standards, Standards-Setting Organizations and Intellectual Property: A Survey of the Literature (with an Emphasis on Empirical Approaches) by Contreras, Jorge L.
SJ Quinney College of Law, University of Utah
Utah Law Digital Commons
Utah Law Faculty Scholarship Utah Law Scholarship
1-25-2017
Technical Standards, Standards-Setting
Organizations and Intellectual Property: A Survey
of the Literature (with an Emphasis on Empirical
Approaches)
Jorge L. Contreras
S.J. Quinney College of Law, University of Utah, jorge.contreras@law.utah.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://dc.law.utah.edu/scholarship
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Utah Law Scholarship at Utah Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Utah Law Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Utah Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
valeri.craigle@law.utah.edu.
Recommended Citation
Contreras, Jorge L., "Technical Standards, Standards-Setting Organizations and Intellectual Property: A Survey of the Literature (with
an Emphasis on Empirical Approaches)" (2017). Utah Law Faculty Scholarship. 11.
http://dc.law.utah.edu/scholarship/11






















	 	 1.	 The	Voluntary	Standard-Setting	Ecosystem	
	 	 2.	 SSO	Membership	












	 	 1.	 Hold-Up	






1 Professor, University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law and Senior Policy Fellow, American 
University Washington College of Law, Program on Information Justice and Intellectual Property.  The 
author thanks Carter Eltzroth, Anne Layne-Farrar, Norman Siebrasse and the editors for their helpful 
comments and suggestions.  Please send further feedback and suggestions to jorge.contreras@law.utah.edu. 











	 	 1.	 Intentional	Non-disclosure	–	Patent	Ambush	
	 	 2.	 Essentiality	
	 B.	 FRAND	Licensing	Disputes	
	 	 1.	 Royalty	Rates	
	 	 2.	 Royalty	Base	and	Apportionment	
	 	 3.	 Nondiscrimination	











	 	 1.	 Incorporation	by	Reference	

















that	 enable	 products	 manufactured	 by	 different	 vendors	 to	 work	 together	 in	 a	
manner	 that	 is	 largely	 invisible	 to	 the	 consumer.	 	 Physical	 product	 configurations	
from	railroad	gauges	to	drill	bits	to	electrical	plugs	have	been	standardized	for	more	
than	 a	 century	 (Shapiro	 and	 Varian	 (1999),	 Ernst	 (2012),	 Russell	 (2014)).	 	 More	
complex,	but	equally	 important,	are	 the	many	networking	(USB,	Wi-Fi,	Bluetooth),	
Internet	 (TCP,	 IPv6,	 HTML),	 and	 telecommunications	 (CDMA,	 GSM,	 UMTS,	 LTE)	
standards	 that	 are	 essential	 to	 the	 global	 technology	 infrastructure.	 Broadly-
adopted	standards	such	as	these	can	produce	efficiency-enhancing	network	effects	




environmental	 standards	 are	 developed	 by	 governmental	 agencies.	 The	 large	
majority	of	interoperability	standards,	however,	are	developed	in	the	private	sector.		
Individual	 firms	may	develop	proprietary	technologies	that,	 through	broad	market	
adoption,	 become	 de	 facto	 standards.	 	 In	 several	 well-known	 cases	 (Betamax	 vs.	
VHS,	HD-DVD	vs.	Blu-ray,	Internet	Explorer	vs.	Netscape	Navigator,	etc.),	competing	
firms	 have	 engaged	 in	 so-called	 “standards	 wars”	 to	 determine	 which	 of	 their	
proprietary	 formats	 would	 eventually	 prevail	 and	 become	 essential	 features	 of	
products	 in	 the	 marketplace	 (Shapiro	 and	 Varian	 (1999),	 Breshnahan	 and	 Yin	
(2007)).	Over	the	past	two	decades,	however,	most	interoperability	standards	have	
been	developed	by	groups	of	market	participants	that	collaborate	within	voluntary	
associations	known	as	 standards-development	organizations	 (SDOs)	or	 standards-




past	 decade	 become	 the	 subject	 of	 significant	 private	 litigation,	 regulatory	
enforcement	 and	 policy	 debate.	 Much	 of	 the	 current	 controversy	 centers	 on	 the	
perceived	 proliferation	 of	 patents	 covering	 standardized	 technologies,	 potentially	
abusive	 enforcement	 of	 such	 patents	 against	 manufacturers	 and	 users	 of	
standardized	products,	and	the	terms	on	which	patent	holders	may	be	required	to	
license	 the	 use	 of	 those	 patents	 to	 others.	 This	 chapter	 offers	 an	 overview	 of	 the	
empirical,	 legal	 and	 economic	 literature	 concerning	 the	 interaction	 of	




2 This Chapter focuses principally on law, policy and organizations that are active in North America 
and Europe, as well as case law developments in the United States and Europe. There is a growing body of 
literature discussing standardization bodies and practices in Asia, particularly China, Japan, Korea and 








	 	 1.	 The	 Voluntary	 Standard-Setting	 Ecosystem.	 Standard-setting	
organizations	 vary	 greatly	 in	 size	 and	 composition.	 	 Some,	 which	 are	 sometimes	
referred	 to	as	 consortia	or	 special	 interest	 groups,	 consist	of	 just	 a	 few	 firms	 that	
collaborate	 on	 a	 narrow	 set	 of	 technical	 specifications,	 sometimes	 for	 a	 single	
product.	 	 Standards	 for	 consumer	 electronics	 devices	 and	media	 such	 as	 the	DVD	
disc	 and	 player	 were	 developed	 in	 this	 manner.	 Other	 SSOs	 have	 thousands	 of	
members	and	oversee	multiple	standardization	activities	at	any	given	time.		
	
	 The	European	Commission	 (2014)	places	SSOs	 into	 three	broad	categories:		
(1)	 those	 that	 are	 formally	 recognized	 by	 governments	 (e.g.,	 the	 European	
Telecommunications	Standards	Institute	(ETSI)	and	the	International	Organisiation	
for	 Standardisation	 (ISO)),	 (2)	 “quasi-formal”	 groups	 that	 are	 typically	 large	 and	
well-organized	and	share	many	of	the	characteristics	of	formally	recognized	groups,	
but	lack	official	governmental	recognition	(e.g.,	the	IEEE	Standards	Association	and	
the	 Internet	 Engineering	 Task	 Force	 (IETF)),	 and	 (3)	 smaller,	 privately-organized	
consortia	(also	known	as	special	 interest	groups	or	fora).	 	 In	addition,	the	work	of	
individual	SSOs	is	sometimes	coordinated	at	national	and	international	 levels.	 	For	
example,	 in	 the	 U.S.,	 the	 American	 National	 Standards	 Institute	 (ANSI)	 oversees,	
accredits	 and	 establishes	 policy	 for	 national	 SSOs	 that	 wish	 to	 develop	 American	
National	Standards.		
	
	 This	 international	 standard-setting	 “ecosystem”	 and	 its	 principal	
components	 are	 described	 in	 greater	 detail	 by	 David	 and	 Shurmer	 (1996),	Mattli	
and	 Büthe	 (2003),	 Nickerson	 and	 zur	 Muehlen	 (2006),	 Cargill	 and	 Bolin	 (2007),	
Biddle	 et	 al	 (2012),	 Ernst	 (2012),	 EC	 (2014),	 Lundqvist	 (2014)	 and	 Gandal	 and	
Régibeau	(2015).		Gandal	and	Régibeau	(2015)	identify	548	active	SSOs	worldwide	
across	 a	 range	 of	 industries.	 	When	 less	 formal	 consortia	 are	 counted,	Updegrove	
(2015)	 catalogs	 nearly	 1,000	 standards-development	 groups	 operating	 in	 various	
fields.	The	increasing	prominence	of	consortia	in	the	standards-development	world,	
and	the	impact	of	consortia	on	innovation	in	standardized	technologies,	is	analyzed	
along	 various	 axes	 of	 accountability,	 transparency,	 efficiency,	 consensus	 and	
flexibility	by	Updegrove	(1995),	Egyedi	(2001a),	Baron	and	Pohlmann	(2013),	Bar	
																																																																																																																																																																					
jurisdictions is summarized, among others, in assorted chapters of NRC (2013) and Contreras (2017). Even 
with this degree of selectivity, the literature of standards, standardization and IP is too large and rapidly 
developing to cover comprehensively in this chapter.  By way of illustration, between March 2013 and 
December 2016, more than 400 papers were distributed via SSRN’s Law, Policy & Economics of Technical 
Standardization eJournal (https://www.ssrn.com/link/Law-Policy-Econ-Tech-Standards.html), with more 
than 100 in 2016 alone and more than 500 papers in the journal’s online repository. In addition, in 2016 no 
fewer than four major reports commissioned by the European Commission in the area of standards and IP 
were released (Pentheroudakis and Baron (2017), Pohlmann and Blind (2016), JRC (2016) and CRA 
(2016)).  And this is just a subset of the still-growing worldwide literature in this field.  
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and	 Leiponen	 (2014),	 Baron,	 Meniere	 and	 Pohlmann	 (2014),	 and	 Delcamp	 and	
Leiponen	(2014).	
	
	 	 2.	 SSO	 Membership.	 Standards	 development	 is	 conducted	
primarily	by	personnel	employed	by	firms	active	in	relevant	product	markets,	with	
the	occasional	 involvement	of	academic	and	governmental	participants.	Baron	and	
Spulber	 (2015),	 using	 membership	 data	 from	 195	 different	 SSOs,	 find	 that	 the	
median	SSO	had	114	members,	and	only	 five	SSOs	had	membership	 levels	greater	
than	1,000.		They	observe	that	several	large	firms	in	the	computing,	semiconductor	
and	 electronics	 industries	 were,	 as	 of	 2013,	 actively	 engaged	 in	 fifty	 or	 more	
different	SSOs.	 	 In	2003,	Updegrove	(2003)	 found	that	 two	major	computing	firms	
were	 each	 involved	 in	more	 than	 150	 SSOs.	 Contreras	 (2014),	 observing	 rates	 of	
Asian	participation	 in	 IETF,	 finds	 that	participation	 in	 Internet	 standardization	by	
Japanese	 and	 Korean	 firms	 has	 remained	 meaningful	 but	 steady	 over	 the	 years,	
while	 participation	by	Chinese	 firms	has	 increased	 from	virtually	 nil	 in	 2003	 to	 a	
position	in	2013	second	only	to	U.S.	firms.	
	
	 	 3.	 SSO	Processes.	The	consensus	standardization	process	was	first	
modeled	by	Farrell	 and	Saloner	 (1988)	as	a	war	of	attrition.	 	Though	 this	process	
was	 shown	 to	 result	 in	 greater	 coordination	 than	 decentralized	 activity,	 it	 is	
cumbersome.	 	 Simcoe	 (2007b,	 2012)	 explores	 the	 length	 of	 the	 standardization	
process	 at	 IETF	 and	 the	 impact	 of	 Internet	 commercialization	 on	 standards	
development.	 Farrell	 and	 Simcoe	 (2012)	 further	 explore	 and	 expand	 the	 war	 of	
attrition	model	for	standard-setting.	
	
	 Though	 the	 processes	 for	 voluntary	 consensus	 standard-setting	 may	 vary	
among	SSOs,	 some	common	 features	are	prescribed	by	 law.	 	 Following	a	 series	of	
cases	 in	 the	 1980s	 involving	 abuses	 of	 the	 standardization	 process	 (Hydrolevel	
(1982),	 Allied	 Tube	 (1988))	 the	 U.S.	 Supreme	 Court	 established	 that	 in	 order	 to	
avoid	 antitrust	 liability,	 SSOs	 should	 observe	 a	 certain	 level	 of	 transparency,	
openness	and	due	process.		These	requirements	have	since	been	embodied	in	OMB	
Circular	 A-119	 (1998),	 which	 governs	 U.S.	 federal	 agency	 use	 of	 private	 sector	
standards,	 as	well	 as	 guidance	 from	U.S.	 antitrust	 enforcement	 agencies	 (DOJ-FTC	
(2000),	DOJ-FTC	(2007)).		Similar	requirements	have	also	been	adopted	in	the	ANSI	














Verspagen	 (2002),	 Iversen	 (2002),	 Cowhey,	 Aronson	 and	
Richards	 (2006),	 Leiponen	 (2008),	 Bekkers	 and	 West	





(2006),	 Simcoe	 (2007b),	 Contreras	 and	 Housley	 (2008),	
Ernst	 (2012),	 Simcoe	 (2012),	 Contreras	 (2013a,	 2014,	
2016a),	Russell	(2014),	Wen	et	al.	(2015)	
INCITS	 Ernst	(2012)	















	 As	 noted	 above,	 standards	 are	 pervasive	 in	 technology	 markets	 today,	
particularly	 computing,	 networking,	 semiconductors	 and	 telecommunications.	
Baron	and	Spulber	(2015)	collect	data	on	more	than	750,000	standards	documents	
from	90	SSOs.		They	find	that	large	formal	SSOs	produced	the	majority	of	standards	
documents,	 with	 two	 groups	 (CEN	 and	 ISO)	 producing	 more	 than	 100,000	
documents	each.	 	The	largest	single-sector	SSO	(ETSI)	produced	more	than	85,000	
documents	 in	 the	 area	 of	 telecommunications	 standardization	 	 (Id.).	 	 The	 authors	
recognize,	however,	that	the	sheer	quantity	of	standards	documents	produced	may	
not	 be	 indicative	 of	 an	 SSO’s	 commercial	 and	 technological	 significance,	 as	major	
SSOs	such	as	IETF	(Internet	standards)	and	IEEE	(Wi-Fi),	have	produced	fewer	than	
5,000	 standards	 documents	 each	 (Id.),	 yet	 have	 shaped	 large	 areas	 of	 technical	
development.	
																																																								
3  HDTV, the U.S. high definition television standard adopted by the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC), was developed through a series of interactions among the FCC and different U.S., 





conducted	 regarding	 the	prevalence	of	 standards	 in	particular	product	 categories.		






	 The	 term	 “open	 standards”	 originally	 arose	 in	 the	 context	 of	 governmental	
procurement	regulations	to	describe	policies	whereby	governmental	agencies	may	
procure	software	or	other	technology	systems	only	if	they	utilize	open	(as	opposed	
to	 “proprietary”	 or	 “closed”)	 standards.	 	 Various	 studies	 cited	 by	 Shah	 and	Kesan	
(2007)	predict	significant	cost	savings	for	agencies	utilizing	open	standards,	which	
can	theoretically	reduce	costs	of	document	format	incompatibility	and	conversion.4	
Recently,	 however,	 use	 of	 the	 term	 “open	 standards”	 has	 expanded	 beyond	







FRAND	 terms,	 and	 development	 in	 a	 process	 open	 to	 public	 participation.	 West	
(2007)	offers	an	economic	analysis	of	openness	along	several	dimensions	including	
access,	 competition	 and	 cost.	 Krechmer	 (2011)	 identifies	 17	 related	 attributes	 of	
open	standards,	classified	according	to	the	requirements	of	different	interest	groups	
(SSOs,	commercial	implementers,	end	users,	economists	and	attorneys).		And	Baron	
and	 Spulber	 (2015)	 consider	 any	 commonly	 available	 standard	 developed	 by	 an	
SSO,	rather	than	owned	by	a	single	firm,	to	be	“open”.	
	
	 In	 the	 procurement	 arena,	 a	 number	 of	 governmental	 bodies	 around	 the	
world	have	mandated	that	open	standards	must	be	available	on	a	royalty-free	basis.	
Updegrove	(2012).	Particularly	notable	in	this	regard	are	recent	policy	initiatives	by	
India	 and	 South	 Africa.	 DeNardis	 (2009),	 Rens	 (2011).	 	 Ghosh	 (2011)	 presents	
evidence	 from	 a	 survey	 of	 955	 public	 officials	 in	 13	 European	 states	 regarding	







4 Nevertheless, Shah and Kesan (2012) find significant interoperability problems even with document 
format standards touted as “open”. 









	 While	 standards	 themselves	 are	 not	 generally	 patentable,	 products	
manufactured	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 protocols	 and	 parameters	 specified	 by	
standards	(often	referred	to	as	standards-compliant	products)	generally	satisfy	the	
statutory	requirements	for	patent	protection.		The	owners	of	patents	covering	these	
standardized	 technologies	 are	 typically	 the	 firms	 and	 institutions	 that	 employ	
individuals	 who	 make	 particular	 inventive	 contributions	 to	 standards.6	Some	 of	
these	contributions	may	be	made	jointly	and	owned	by	multiple	firms,	but	in	most	
cases	 firms	 individually	 submit	 technical	 contributions	 to	 the	 standard-setting	







	 Numerous	 efforts	 have	 been	made	 to	 estimate	 the	 number	 of	 patents	 that	
cover	 particular	 standards.	 	 Several	 SSOs	 permit	 or	 require	 their	 participants	 to	
disclose	 patents	 that	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 necessary	 for	 the	manufacture	 and	 use	 of	 a	
standards-compliant	 products	 (see	 discussion	 of	 SSO	 disclosure	 requirements	 in	




	 Aggregate	Statistics.	 	One	of	 the	 first	 studies	seeking	 to	quantify	aggregated	
SEP	 data	 was	 conducted	 by	 Simcoe	 (2007a),	 who	 reviewed	 approximately	 1,300	
patent	 disclosures	 at	 nine	 telecommunications-focused	 SSOs	 between	 1981	 and	
2004.	 	This	data	 shows	a	dramatic	 increase	 in	patent	disclosures	beginning	 in	 the	
early	 1990s,	with	 the	 greatest	 number	 of	 disclosures	 occurring	 at	 ETSI,	 IEEE	 and	
ITU.	 	Blind	et	al	 (2011)	 reviewed	approximately	8,000	patent	disclosures	made	at	




were	 disclosed	 at	 ETSI	 alone	 (relating	 to	 more	 than	 1,300	 different	 standards).	




Blind (2011) and Ernst (2012). 
6 SSO themselves seldom if ever seek to claim any patent rights in standards that they produce. 
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	 Organizations.	 Each	of	 these	authors	 also	 studied	 the	organizations	making	
SSO	patent	disclosures.	 	Blind	et	al.	 (2011)	 identifies	292	such	patent	holders,	 the	
top	 five	 being	 Nokia,	 Qualcomm,	 InterDigital,	 Ericsson	 and	 Motorola.	 	 Baron	 and	
Pohlmann	(2015),	utilizing	their	larger	data	set,	 identify	more	than	2,000	different	
patent	holders,	 led	by	Qualcomm,	InterDigital,	LG	Electronics,	Nokia,	Samsung	and	
Ericsson.	 	 Simcoe	 (2007a)	observes	 a	 significant	 increase	 in	patent	disclosures	by	




SEP	 declarations	 by	 country/region,	 finding	 that	 in	 the	 aggregate,	 the	 greatest	
number	 of	 declared	 SEPs	were	 filed	 in	 the	 U.S.	 (over	 50,000),	 followed	 by	 Japan,	
China	and	Europe.	 	Pohlmann	and	Blind	 (2016),	 analyzing	 the	 same	data	 set	over	
time,	 observe	 that	 while	 the	 greatest	 number	 of	 declared	 SEPs	 in	 the	 1990s	
originated	in	the	U.S.,	Europe	and	Japan,	since	the	early	2000s	the	number	of	SEPs	
from	China,	Korea	and	Taiwan	have	 increased,	with	a	comparative	decline	of	SEPs	
from	Germany,	 Japan	 and	 the	U.S.	 	 Focusing	 on	 IETF,	 Contreras	 (2014)	 finds	 that	
between	2001	and	2012,	patent	disclosures	by	 Japanese	 firms	remained	relatively	




by	 a	 number	 of	 case	 studies	 quantifying	 patent	 disclosure	 at	 individual	 SSOs.		








conducted	 by	 Caviggioli	 et	 al.	 (2015)	 on	 approximately	 13,000	 patents	 disclosed	
with	 respect	 to	 later	 versions	 of	 the	 4G	 LTE	 standard.	 	 In	 contrast	 to	 the	 earlier	
study,	 they	 find	 a	 lower	 degree	 of	 concentration	 with	 respect	 to	 LTE	 SEPs	 than	
earlier	ETSI	standards	(CR4	concentration	of	47%),	which	they	attribute	 to	recent	
market	 entry	 by	 firms	 ranging	 from	Apple	 to	 smaller	 Asian	manufacturers.	 Cyber	




7 CR4 and CR8 concentration ratios measure the total output produced in a given market by a specified 
number of firms (four in the case of CR4 and eight in the case of CR8).  Thus, a higher ratio indicates that 






SSOs,	 at	 least	 in	 certain	 high	 technology	 sectors,	 has	 increased	 over	 the	 past	 two	
decades.		This	increase	can	potentially	be	explained	if	SEPs	are	perceived	to	have	a	
higher	 value	 than	 non-SEPs.	 	 Several	 authors	 have	 hypothesized	 that	 SEPs	 are	
valuable	both	as	bargaining	chips	in	cross-licensing	negotiations	as	well	as	forming	
the	 basis	 for	 direct	 licensing	 revenue	 (Bekkers,	 Bongard	 and	 Nuvolari	 (2011),	
Pohlmann	 and	 Blind	 (2016)).	 	 Accordingly,	 numerous	 studies	 have	 sought	 to	
measure	the	value	of	SEPs	based	on	a	variety	of	metrics.	
	
	 Maintenance.	 	 Pohlmann	 and	 Blind	 (2016),	 using	 a	 sample	 of	 more	 than	
200,000	 declared	 SEPs	 and	 a	 matched	 sample	 of	 non-SEPs	 from	 corresponding	
patent	 offices,	 observe	 that	 holders	 of	 SEPs	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 pay	 required	
maintenance	 fees	 to	 keep	 SEPs	 in	 force	 (67%	 of	 SEPs	 versus	 76%	 of	 non-SEPs	





SEPs	were	somewhat	more	 likely	 to	be	 transferred	by	 their	owners	 (12%	of	SEPs	
versus	10%	of	non-SEPs	transferred	at	least	once	during	their	lifetimes),	suggesting	
a	 higher	 value	 or	 utility	 for	 SEPs,	 at	 least	 in	 the	 perception	 of	 the	 transferees.		




	 Market	 Share.	 Bekkers,	 Duysters	 and	 Verspagen	 (2002)	 observe	 a	 positive	
correlation	 between	 the	 ownership	 of	 patents	 covering	 the	 3G	GSM	 standard	 and	
firms’	 share	 of	 the	 European	market	 for	 telecommunications	 equipment.	 Bekkers,	
Verspagen	and	Smits	(2002)	also	analyze	the	impact	of	patents	on	development	of	
the	 GSM	 standard,	 noting	 in	 particular	 the	 ability	 of	 Motorola	 to	 enter	 and	 exert	
influence	over	the	 largely	European	standardization	effort	due	to	 its	strong	patent	
portfolio.	 	 They	 attribute	 the	 intensification	 of	 patenting	 activity	 in	 the	
telecommunications	 sector,	 in	 large	 part,	 to	 Motorola’s	 demonstrated	 success	 at	
influencing	 the	 GSM	 standardization	 process	 in	 the	 early	 1990s.	 	 These	 studies	





prior	 art	 by	 later	 patent	 applications.9		 Rysman	 and	 Simcoe	 (2008)	 study	 724	
																																																								
8 See also Part V.E discussing transfer of FRAND and other SSO licensing commitments. 
9 The number of times a patent is cited as prior art in subsequent patent applications has become a 
widely used measure of the value of a patent in economic analyses.  Trajtenberg (1990), Albert et al. 
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patents	 disclosed	 as	 essential	 at	 four	 major	 SSOs.	 They	 find	 that,	 even	 before	
disclosure	at	the	SSO,	SEPs	receive	twice	as	many	citations	as	non-SEPs	in	the	same	
technical	 field	 and	 year	 of	 application,	 suggesting	 that	 SSOs	 select	 important	
technologies	 for	 standardization.	 	 After	 disclosure	 at	 the	 SSO,	 SEPs	 gained	 an	
additional	19%-47%	increase	in	citations,	suggesting	that	the	fact	that	a	technology	
becomes	 standardized	 itself	 increases	 the	 value	 of	 the	 underlying	 patents. 10		
Consistent	 results	 showing	 greater	 citation	 frequency	 for	 SEPs	 are	 obtained	 by	
Simcoe,	 Graham	 and	 Feldman	 (2009),	 Layne-Farrar	 (2011),	 Baron	 and	 Pohlmann	
(2015),	Caviggioli	et	al.	(2015)	and	Pohlmann	and	Blind	(2016).		Bekkers,	Bongard	
and	 Nuvolari	 (2011)	 study	 a	 sample	 of	 approximately	 10,000	 patents,	





	 In	 a	 somewhat	 contrary	 vein,	 Bekkers	 and	 West	 (2009)	 analyze	 SEPs	
disclosed	in	ETSI’s	GSM	and	UMTS	standardization	programs.	They	detect	a	decline	
in	 the	 number	 citations	 of	 UMTS	 SEPs	 as	 compared	 with	 the	 earlier	 GSM	 SEPs,	
despite	 the	 substantial	 increase	 in	 patents	 disclosed	 in	 the	UMTS	program.	 	 They	
posit	 that	 this	 decline	 in	 citations	 (and,	 in	 theory,	 value)	 may	 be	 due	 to	 a	
proliferation	of	patents	claiming	only	incremental	or	minor	technical	advances.		
	
	 Litigation.		Another	measure	of	 the	potential	value	of	SEPs	 is	 the	 frequency	
with	 which	 such	 patents	 are	 litigated.	 	 In	 theory,	 once	 a	 technology	 becomes	
standardized	and	is	thus	harder	to	design	around,	infringement	of	patents	covering	
that	 technology	 should	 also	 increase.	 	 	 Validating	 this	hypothesis,	 Simcoe	 (2007a)	
finds	that	SEPs	are	ten	times	more	likely	than	comparable	non-SEPs	to	be	litigated,	
and	 Simcoe,	 Graham	 and	 Feldman	 (2009)	 find	 that	 the	 rate	 at	 which	 SEPs	 are	
litigated	 is	 9.4%	 versus	 1.7%	 for	 comparable	 non-SEPs.	 	 Pohlmann	 and	 Blind	
(2016),	 using	 a	 large	 sample	 of	 SEPs	 and	 comparable	 non-SEPs,	 find	 that	 the	
average	number	of	 litigated	SEPs	 in	the	sample	was	1.93%,	compared	to	0.45%	in	
the	control	group.	Pohlmann	and	Blind	(2016)	also	tabulate	the	number	of	declared	
SEPs	 subject	 to	 litigation	by	owner,	 finding	 that	 the	majority	 of	 litigated	 SEPs	 are	
held	by	a	handful	of	 large	players	 (e.g.,	Qualcomm	(20,678	SEPs	and	888	 litigated	
SEPs),	 Interdigital	 (12,522	 SEPs	 and	 978	 litigated	 SEPs),	 Nokia	 (13,393	 SEPs	 and	
557	 litigated	 SEPs),	 Panasonic	 (6,326	 SEPs	 and	 572	 litigated	 SEPs),	 Samsung	
(10,618	 SEPs	 and	 502	 litigated	 SEPs)	 and	 Ericsson	 (9,396	 SEPs	 and	 467	 litigated	
SEPs).12	Gupta	 and	 Snyder	 (2014)	 offer	 a	 contrasting	 view	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	
																																																																																																																																																																					
(1991), Harhoff et al. (1999). 
10 This effect has been referred to as the “value of the standard”.  See Siebrasse and Cotter (2017), 
Sidak (2016). 
11 See Part IV.A.2 regarding differing definitions of essentiality and over-declaration of patents as 
essential to certain standards. 
12 Interestingly, several large Asian firms appearing in Pohlmann and Blind’s study hold large numbers 
of SEPs, but have asserted none of them in litigtation: NTT Docomo (4,216 SEPs), NEC (2,299 SEPs), 




SEPs	 covering	 implementation	 or	 design	 features	 of	 particular	 devices,	 and	 that	
fewer	than	one-third	of	patents	involved	in	smart	phone	litigation	are	SEPs.	
	
	 Firm	 Performance.	 Pohlmann,	 Neuhäusler	 and	 Blind	 (2015)	 and	 Mallinson	
(2015)	 approach	 the	 question	 of	 SEP	 value	 from	 the	 standpoint	 of	 firm	 financial	




that	 excessive	 SEP	 disclosure	 (over-disclosure)	 is	 correlated	 with	 diminished	
performance.	 	 They	 also	 find	 that	 the	 marginal	 impact	 of	 SEPs	 is	 stronger	 when	
disclosed	to	informal	SSOs	than	formal,	recognized	SSOs.		Mallinson	collects	data	on	
R&D	 spending	 and	 licensing	 revenue	 from	major	holders	 of	 SEPs	 covering	 the	4G	
LTE	standard,	as	well	as	other	statistics	regarding	the	smart	phone	market,	to	argue	














allegations	 made	 in	 the	 Rambus	 cases14	to	 argue	 that	 liberal	 continuation	 and	
division	 practices	 in	 patent	 prosecution	 enable	 opportunistic	 applicants	 to	
circumvent	SSO	disclosure	policies	and	obtain	patents	directed	to	specific	technical	
features	under	discussion	at	an	SSO.	To	test	a	similar	hypothesis,	Berger,	Blind	and	
Thumm	 (2012)	 analyze	 the	 prosecution	 history	 of	 approximately	 300	 SEPs	




one of the earliest firms to seek to monetize its patent portfolio, which holds 487 SEPs, with none litigated 
within the parameters of the study. 
13 This Part focuses on patenting behavior by firms that are involved in the SSO standardization 
process. Wen et al (2015) offer evidence supporting the hypothesis that standardization in a technical area 
tends to reduce defensive (strategic) patenting by firms that are not engaged in the standardization process, 
presumably due to a lower need for patent assets as countermeasures against infringement claims by SSO 
participants that are bound to license SEPs to such non-participants. 
14 According to the complaint filed by the FTC, Rambus allegedly shaped its patent claims to cover 
technical discussions being held contemporaneously at JEDEC.  See Section IV.A below. 
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to	 cover	 standards	 under	 development	 and	 drag	 out	 the	 prosecution	 process	 in	




from	 53	 different	 firms	 who	 attended	 77	 3GPP	 meetings	 over	 a	 12-year	 period	
during	which	 the	W-CDMA	 and	 LTE	wireless	 telecommunications	 standards	were	
developed.	 They	 observed	 a	 phenomenon	 that	 they	 term	 “just-in-time-patenting”:	
SSO	 participants	 apply	 for	 patents	 of	 “low	 technical	 merit”15	in	 large	 quantities	
immediately	 before	 an	 SSO	 meeting,	 then	 send	 participants	 to	 the	 meeting	 to	
negotiate	 the	 inclusion	of	 the	patented	 technology	 into	 the	standard.	They	 further	
observe	that	this	tactic	 is	concentrated	among	vertically	 integrated	firms,	 typically	
those	who	champion	the	incumbent	standard.16	
	
	 The	 foregoing	 studies	 suggest	 that	 patent	 holders	 involved	 in	 SSOs	 may	
opportunistically	seek	to	maximize	the	number	of	SEPs	that	they	obtain	and	declare.		
Layne-Farrar	 (2011),	 however,	 challenges	 this	 conclusion	 based	 on	 an	 analysis	 of	
approximately	1,200	U.S.	patents	declared	as	essential	 to	 the	ETSI	UMTS	standard	
both	before	(ex	ante)	and	after	(ex	post)	finalization	of	the	standard.		She	finds	that	
firms	 did	 not	 increase	 their	 rates	 of	 patenting	 after	 this	 technology	 had	 been	
standardized.		When	viewed	together	with	the	higher	citation	counts	found	for	SEPs,	
Layne-Farrar	 hypothesizes	 that	 ex	 post	 patenting	 may	 be	 attributable	 to	 some	








ECMA	 International	 during	 the	 1990s	 and	 cites	 several	 instances	 in	which	 fear	 of	
intellectual	property	claims	(both	patent	and	copyright)	stifled	cooperation	within	
the	SSO,	eventually	leading	to	the	collapse	of	the	standardization	process.		Contreras	
(2008,	2016a)	discusses	particular	 instances	at	 IETF	and	W3C	 in	which	 threats	of	





15 Forward citation rates of SEPs filed by SSO participants in the week before and during an SSO 
meeting were significantly lower than those of a control group. 
16 These observations were validated by the authors’ direct observations as well as reports from 
participants at SSO meetings, including one former manager who explained at a public conference “how he 
would send staff to a standardization meeting, and right after the meeting, in the hotel room, they would 
brainstorm how to combine elements mentioned by other participants, and then immediately prepare patent 






	 Egyedi	 (2016)	 interviewed	 participants	 in	 ITU’s	 H.265	 standardization	
process	and	found	that	technical	design	choices	were	made	for	a	range	of	practical	





	 Baron	 et	 al	 (2013)	 analyzed	 3500	 standards	 released	 between	 1998	 and	
2008	 and	 found	 that	 higher	 concentrations	 of	 SEPs	 caused	 standards	 to	 be	 less	
likely	 to	 be	 replaced,	 but	 increased	 the	 likelihood	 that	 they	 would	 be	 upgraded	
through	 new	 version	 releases.	 They	 attribute	 this	 effect	 to	 frictions	 and	 vested	
interests	 in	 existing	 patented	 technologies	 (i.e.,	 a	 lock-in	 effect	 based	 on	 SEP	
ownership).	
	
	 The	 foregoing	 studies	 suggest	 that	 the	 existence	 of	 patents	 covering	
technologies	being	standardized	has	an	impact,	generally	negative	or	neutral	at	best,	
on	 the	 standardization	 processes	 studied.	 	 It	 is	 important	 to	 note,	 however,	 that	







	 One	 of	 the	 challenges	 that	 faces	 patent	 offices	 examining	 applications	 for	






	 To	 address	 these	 concerns,	 the	 European	 Patent	 Office	 (EPO)	 has	 entered	
into	 cooperative	 arrangements	with	 several	 leading	 SSOs	 including	 ETSI,	 ITU	 and	
IEEE.	EC	(2014),	NRC	(2013).	Under	 these	arrangements,	 the	SSOs	have	agreed	 to	
share	a	variety	of	documentation	with	 the	EPO	 for	use	 in	patent	examinations.	As	










	 G.	 Potential	 Market	 Effects:	 Hold-Up,	 Hold-Out	 and	 Stacking.	 	 There	 is	
significant	debate	across	the	industry	and	academy	regarding	the	impact	of	patents	
on	 the	 development	 and	 distribution	 of	 standardized	 products.	 	 CRA	 (2016)	
classifies	 these	potential	 issues	and	gauged	their	relative	 importance	to	a	range	of	
stakeholders	using	a	consultation	exercise	involving	40	respondents	and	a	series	of	
36	 interviews.	They	 found	that	 injunctions,	hold	out,	hold	up,	royalty	stacking	and	
over-declaration	 of	 SEPs	were	 perceived	 as	 the	 “main	 problems”	 caused	 by	 SEPs.		
Each	of	these	issues	is	discussed	in	greater	detail	below.	
	
	 	 1.	 Hold-Up.	 There	 is	 a	 large	 and	 varied	 theoretical	 literature	
concerning	 the	 potential	 effects	 that	 patents	 covering	 standards	 may	 have	 on	
product	development	and	markets.	 	One	of	 the	principal	areas	of	debate	concerns	
the	 potential	 for	 SEP	 owners	 to	 “hold-up”	 the	 market	 by	 demanding	 excessive	
royalty	rates	after	a	standard	has	been	widely	adopted	and	manufacturers	who	have	
made	investments	in	the	standardized	technology	have	become	“locked-in”	(Shapiro	
(2001),	 Swanson	 and	 Baumol	 (2006),	 Farrell	 et	 al.	 (2007),	 Lemley	 and	 Shapiro	
(2007),	 Lichtman	 (2010),	 Chien	 and	 Lemley	 (2012),	 Chien	 (2014)).	 In	 addition	 to	
raising	costs	for	potential	competitors,	 it	has	also	been	theorized	that	patent	hold-
up	 can	 increase	 consumer	 prices	 and	 hinder	 innovation.	 The	 potential	 for	
standards-based	 patent	 hold-up	 has	 been	 echoed	 by	 antitrust	 and	 competition	
authorities	 in	 the	 U.S.,	 Europe	 and	 elsewhere	 (DOJ-FTC	 (2007),	 FTC	 (2011),	 FTC	
(2012),	 EC	 (2014)),	 as	 well	 as	 by	 courts	 adjudicating	 standards-related	 cases	
(Microsoft	 (2013),	 Ericsson	 (2014)).	 	 Ernst,	 Lee	 and	 Kwak	 (2014),	 taking	 an	
international	 perspective,	 argue	 that	 strategic	 patenting	 of	 standardized	
technologies	 can	 stifle	 economic	 development,	 particularly	 in	 less-developed	
economies.	 Siebrasse	 (2017)	 offers	 a	 comprehensive	 survey	 of	 the	 theoretical	
literature	concerning	hold-up	for	standardized	products.	
	
	 Nevertheless,	 systematic	evidence	of	standards-based	patent	hold-up	 in	 the	
market	 has	 not	 been	 collected,	 and	 reports	 of	 hold-up	 by	 individual	 firms	 are	





2015b)).	 In	 a	 recent	 study,	 Galetovic,	 Haber	 and	 Levine	 (2015)	 measure	 market	
characteristics	 that	 have	 traditionally	 been	 associated	 with	 industries	 subject	 to	











	 Commentators	have	also	drawn	attention	 to	 the	potential	 for	opportunistic	
behavior	 by	 standards	 implementers	 (licensees),	 which	 has	 been	 referred	 to	 as	
“reverse	 hold-up”	 or	 “hold-out”	 (Geradin	 (2010),	 Kieff	 and	 Layne-Farrar	 (2013),	




the	 implementer’s	 infringement,	 the	 SEP	 holder	 has	 little	 recourse	 but	 to	 sue	 the	
implementer	 for	patent	 infringement	 and	 recover,	 at	most,	 the	 reasonable	 royalty	




out	 situations	 as	 instances	 in	which	 it	may	be	 reasonable	 for	 SEP	holders	 to	 seek	
injunctive	 relief	 to	 prevent	 ongoing	 infringement	 by	 recalcitrant	 implementers	
(Motorola	and	Google	 (2013)).	 	Nevertheless,	 like	 hold-up,	 there	 is	 little	 empirical	
evidence	relating	to	the	prevalence	of	hold-out	in	standard-setting	environments.18	
	
	 	 2.	 Royalty	Stacking.	As	described	by	the	U.S.	Court	of	Appeals	for	
the	 Federal	 Circuit,	 “[r]oyalty	 stacking	 can	 arise	 when	 a	 standard	 implicates	
numerous	patents,	perhaps	hundreds,	 if	not	 thousands.	 If	 companies	are	 forced	 to	
pay	royalties	 to	all	 [patent]	holders,	 the	royalties	will	 “stack”	on	 top	of	each	other	
and	may	become	excessive	in	the	aggregate”	(Ericsson	(2014)).		Lemley	and	Shapiro	
(2007)	have	argued	that	stacking	will	result	in	higher	prices	for	consumers	because	
(a)	 patent	 holders	 and	 product	 manufacturers	 will	 each	 seek	 to	 maximize	 their	
margins	(a	phenomenon,	which	is	not	unique	to	patent	licensing,	known	as	“double	
marginalization”),	 and	 (b)	 holders	 of	 complementary	 patents	 will	 increase	 their	
royalties	to	a	level	that,	in	the	aggregate,	will	depress	sales	of	end	products	and,	in	
turn,	 reduce	 their	 individual	 profits	 (the	 well-known	 problem	 of	 “Cournot	




 Interestingly,	 though	 the	 large	 number	 of	 patents	 covering	 various	
standardized	 technologies	 has	 been	 amply	 documented	 (see	 Part	 II.B	 above),	
relatively	little	public	data	is	available	regarding	aggregate	patent	royalty	rates	for	
standardized	 products.	 In	 the	 mid-2000s,	 a	 number	 of	 SEP	 holders	 voluntarily	
disclosed	 their	 standard	 licensing	 rates	 for	 wireless	 telecommunications	
standards	 (Contreras	 2015c,	 Table	 4),	 and	 there	 was	 at	 least	 one	 attempt	 by	 a	
group	 of	 network	 operators	 to	 establish	 maximum	 aggregate	 royalty	 rates	 for	
																																																								
17 Contreras and Gilbert (2015) argue that FRAND royalties should be calculated in essentially the 
same manner as reasonable royalty damages. 
18 In one early interview-based study, Blind and Iversen (2004), found that of large companies 
involved in standardization, 40% responded that their licensing conditions had not been accepted, and 35% 




consortium	 (Contreras	 2013a,	 178-79).	 	 More	 recently,	 evidence	 regarding	 SEP	
royalty	 rates	 has	 emerged	 in	 litigation	over	 SEP	 licensing	 terms	 (see	Part	 IV.B.1	




[t]here	 are	 at	 least	 92	 entities	 that	 own	 802.11	 [standard-essential	





On	 this	basis,	 the	 court	determined	 that	 the	 royalty	 sought	by	 the	patent	holder	
was	 unreasonable,	 because	 “if	 everyone	wanted	 the	 same	 deal,	 it	would	 quickly	
make	 the	 end-product	 price	 untenable	 commercially”	 Microsoft	 (2013). 19 	In	










	 Outside	 of	 judicial	 proceedings,	 however,	 data	 regarding	 patent	 royalty	





	 Notwithstanding	 the	difficulty	of	obtaining	FRAND	royalty	data,	 there	 is	a	
growing	 body	 of	 empirical	 literature	 seeking	 to	 quantify	 the	 aggregate	 patent	
royalty	burden	 for	various	standardized	 technologies.	Geradin,	Layne-Farrar	and	
Padilla	 (2008)	 review	earlier	 (non-standards	based)	 empirical	 studies	of	 royalty	






	 Stasik	 (2010)	 analyzes	 the	 aggregate	 royalty	 burden	 on	 ETSI’s	 4G	 LTE	
standard,	 as	 to	which	 several	major	 patent	 holders	 have	 voluntarily	 announced	
																																																								
19 But see Layne-Farrar and Wong-Ervin (2014), using numerical examples to critique this approach. 
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royalty	 rates	 or	 ranges.	 Based	 on	 early	 announcements	 by	 nine	major	 LTE	 SEP	
holders,	 Stasik	 finds	 an	 aggregate	 royalty	 burden	 of	 14.8%	 of	 the	 end	 product	
price.		Armstrong,	Mueller	and	Syrett (2014) quantify	the	royalty	“stack”	for	smart	
phone	devices	by	 identifying	and	aggregating	known	and	estimated	royalty	rates	





	 Other	 authors,	 however,	 contest	 the	 evidence	 of	 royalty	 stacking	 in	
standardized	 technologies.	 In	addition	 to	disagreement	over	 the	 theoretical	claims	
made	by	Lemley	and	Shapiro	(2007),	they	observe	that	despite	the	large	number	of	
patents	 covering	 standards	 for	 technologies	 such	 as	 3G	 and	 Wi-Fi,	 these	
technologies	have	flourished	in	the	marketplace,	suggesting	that	in	practice	royalty	
stacking	 may	 not	 present	 a	 significant	 market	 risk.	 Geradin,	 Layne-Farrar	 and	
Padilla	(2008),	Sidak	(2008),	Gupta	(2013),	Mallinson	(2015).			
	
	 Galetovic	 and	 Gupta	 (2016)	 look	 to	 secondary	 market	 effects	 to	 draw	
conclusions	 about	 whether	 royalty	 stacking	 has	 occurred	 in	 the	 mobile	 wireless	
industry.	 	They	observe	that	from	1994	to	2013,	the	number	of	firms	holding	SEPs	
covering	ETSI’s	2G,	3G	and	4G	standards	increased	from	2	to	130.	At	the	same	time,	






	 In	 an	 effort	 to	 link	 claims	 of	 harm	 arising	 from	 royalty	 stacking	 to	 actual	
evidence	of	harm,	the	court	in	Ericsson	(2014)	required	that	claims	alleging	damage	
due	 to	royalty	stacking	must	be	supported	by	actual	evidence	of	such	harm	to	 the	
claimant.	Sidak	(2016).	The	court’s	 reasoning	 is	questioned	by	Contreras	 (2015d),	
who	argues	that	royalty	stacking	with	respect	to	a	standard	may	have	an	impact	on	
the	 reasonableness	 of	 any	 particular	 SEP	 holder’s	 individual	 royalty	 rate,	
irrespective	of	the	magnitude	of	royalties	paid	by	the	implementer	at	the	time	of	an	
infringement	 suit	 by	 the	 SEP	holder.	 	 Requiring	 the	 implementer	 to	 show	 specific	







of	 approximately	 5%,	 based	 on	 estimated	 industry-wide	 annual	 U.S.	 smart	 phone	 SEP	 licensing	





	 Several	 important	 standards,	 particularly	 in	 the	 consumer	 electronics	
industry,	 were	 developed	 by	 small	 groups	 of	 firms	 that	 make	 their	 standards-
essential	patents	available	through	patent	pools.		Well-known	patent	pools	exist	for	
popular	 families	of	 standards	such	as	MPEG,	CD	and	DVD.	 	Patent	pools	have	also	
been	formed	for	standards	that	were	developed	in	larger	SSOs,	often	containing	only	
a	 subset	 of	 the	 known	 SEPs	 covering	 those	 standards.	 	 Examples	 include	 the	 Via	
Licensing	and	Sisvel	pools	for	IEEE’s	802.11	standard	and	MPEG-LA’s	pool	for	ITU’s	
H.264	standard.	Microsoft	(2013),	Bekkers	and	Updegrove	(2012).		The	DVB	Forum	
offers	 a	 unique	 example	 of	 a	 developer	 of	 voluntary	 consensus	 standards,	 all	
members	of	which	participate	in	a	patent	pool.		Eltzroth	(2008).	
	
	 Patent	 pools	 offer	 numerous	 efficiencies	 in	 licensing	 and	 are	 generally	
characterized	by	license	terms	(including	royalties)	that	are	published	and	uniform	
across	all	 licensees,	 though	care	must	be	 taken	 to	avoid	anticompetitive	 collective	
activity	 in	 the	 formation	and	operation	of	 such	pools.	 	 Shapiro	and	Varian	 (1999),	
Shapiro	(2001),	Contreras	(2013b),	Lundqvist	(2014).	Despite	the	potential	benefits	
offered	 by	 pools,	 relatively	 few	 patent	 pools	 have	 been	 formed	 around	 technical	
interoperability	 standards.	 Biddle,	 White	 and	 Woods	 (2010)	 find	 that	 of	 251	
standards	 implemented	 in	 a	 typical	 laptop	 computer,	 only	 3%	 were	 subject	 to	
patent	 pools,	 with	 the	 remainder	 subject	 to	 FRAND	 or	 royalty-free	 licensing	
commitments.	 Polhmann	 (2016),	 analyzing	 more	 than	 200,000	 individual	 SEP	
declarations,	 finds	 that	 only	 9%	 of	 declared	 SEPs	 are	 pooled.	 There	 are	 several	
possible	explanations	for	the	relative	scarcity	of	patent	pools	in	the	field,	including	
significant	 up-front	 costs	 associated	 with	 evaluating	 pooled	 patents	 for	
essentiality. 21 	Contreras	 (2013b).	 There	 is	 a	 large	 empirical	 and	 theoretical	




aggregated	SEP	 licenses	was	 Intellectual	Property	Exchange	 International	 (IPXI),	a	
trading	 exchange	 that	 offered	 unitized	 license	 contracts	 covering	 194	 patents	





	 A	 significant	 amount	 of	 recent	 empirical	 literature	 seeks	 to	 measure	 the	
quantity	and	effect	of	litigation	activity	by	so-called	patent	assertion	entities	(PAEs).	
FTC	 (2016),	 JRC	 (2016).	 Most	 of	 this	 work	 is	 centered	 in	 the	 U.S.	 and	 Europe.		
																																																								
21 Unlike SEPs subject to licensing commitments by the patent holder, current interpretations of 
antitrust law require that patents contributed to a pool must be found to be essential to the standard by an 
objective evaluator.  DOJ-FTC (2000), DOJ-FTC (2007). CRA (2016) reports that the estimated cost of a 
third party patent essentiality assessment is approximately EUR 9000 (p.50), and that imposing such a cost 




Concurrently,	 there	 have	 been	 numerous	 proposals	 to	 amend	 legislation	 and	
regulations	to	address	perceived	issues	arising	from	PAE	litigation.		 Several	
prominent	 reported	 cases	 involve	 assertion	 of	 SEPs	 by	 PAEs,	 including	 N-Data	
(2008)	 and	 Innovatio	 (2013).	 	 However,	 there	 has	 been	 comparatively	 little	
empirical	 work	 studying	 the	 accumulation	 and	 assertion	 of	 standards-essential	
patents	by	PAEs.		
	
	 The	 first	 empirical	 study	 of	 SEP	 assertion	 by	 PAEs	 appears	 to	 be	 that	
conducted	by	Contreras	(2016b).	 	This	study	measured	assertion	of	SEPs	covering	
seven	widely-adopted	 standards	 in	 U.S.	 district	 courts	 from	 2000-2015.	 	 It	 found	
that	77%	of	these	assertions	were	initiated	by	non-practicing	entities	(NPEs),	most	
of	which	were	PAEs,	and	that	both	NPEs	and	practicing	entities	asserted	significant	









Planet,	 Innovative	 Sonic)	 are	 among	 the	 largest	 acquirors	 of	 SEPs	 (Table	 5).	
Interestingly,	these	results	were	not	observed	by	the	U.S.	FTC	in	a	study	released	in	
the	 same	year	 (FTC	2016).	 	 The	FTC,	 based	on	 surveys	distributed	 to	22	 selected	






	 The	 vast	 majority	 of	 literature	 relating	 to	 patents	 and	 technology	
standardization	 has	 focused	 on	 the	 information	 and	 communications	 technology	
(ICT)	 sector.	As	 reported,	however,	by	Blind	et	 al.	 (2011),	NRC	 (2013),	EC	 (2014)	
and	Baron	and	Spulber	(2015),	significant	standardization	activities	occur	outside	of	
ICT.	 	 At	 least	 two	 significant	 actions	 by	 the	 U.S.	 Federal	 Trade	 Commission	 have	









(synthetic	 biology)	 Kumar	 and	 Rai	 (2007)	 (synthetic	 biology),	 Contreras	 (2013c)	




grid).	 Several	 of	 these	 authors	 observe,	 however,	 that	 patents	 could	 play	 an	




patent	 intensity	 for	 nine	 different	 technology-focused	 industries	 including	 ICT,	
aeronautics,	 optoelectronics,	 nanotechnology,	 pharmaceuticals	 and	 biotechnology	
(Fig.	4.4-1).	They	conclude	that	issues	relating	to	patents	and	standards	are	the	most	
heated	in	industries	with	the	highest	levels	of	standardization	and	patent	intensity,	







patents	 covering	 standardized	 technologies	 and	 the	 perceived	 threats	 of	 patent	
hold-up	and	stacking	by	adopting	a	 series	of	policy	measures	 intended	 to	address	
these	 concerns.22		 EC	 (2014)	 identifies	 seven	distinct	 goals	 of	 SSO	patent	 policies:	
(1)	 enabling	 informed	 decisions	 about	 technology	 inclusion,	 alternatives	 and	
design-around,	 (2)	 ensuring	 that	 licenses	 for	 SEPs	 are	 available,	 (3)	 preventing	
patent	 hold-up,	 (4)	 preventing	 patent	 “ambush”	 and	 blocking,	 (5)	 preventing	
excessive	 cumulative	 royalties	 (stacking),	 (6)	 preventing	 discrimination	 among	
implementers	 of	 a	 standard,	 and	 (7)	 ensuring	 transparency	 about	 SEPs.	 	 Bekkers	




and	 licensing	 policies,	 and	 often	 include	 elements	 of	 both.	 Disclosure	 policies	
typically	 require	 participants	 in	 the	 standards	 development	 process	 to	 disclose	
patents	 they	 hold	 that	 are	 believed	 to	 be	 essential	 to	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	











22 SSO policies are generally assumed to be binding on SSO participants through a series of legal 
mechanisms including contract, estoppel and antitrust/competition law.  Lemley (2002), Contreras (2015a). 
23 The terms RAND and FRAND are, for all practical purposes, synonymous (DOJ-PTO (2013)). 
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portfolios	 to	 identify	 SEPs,	 and	 whether	 they	 included	 a	 licensing	 requirement	
(RAND	or	royalty-free)).	 	Chiao,	Lerner	and	Tirole	(2007)	assess	the	policies	of	59	
SSOs	 and	 code	 for	 features	 including	 form	 of	 membership	 (corporate	 versus	
individual),	 decision	making	 rule	 (majority	 or	 consensus),	 and	 SSO	 age	 and	 scope	
(single	or	multi-purpose).	Bekkers	and	Updegrove	(2012)	offer	an	in-depth	survey	
of	 the	 policies	 of	 12	 SSOs	 representing	 a	 cross	 section	 of	 organizational	 models,	
geographic	region,	and	technology	focus.		They	describe	in	detail	the	many	variants	
that	 SSOs	 have	 adopted	 regarding	 the	 mechanics	 of	 patent	 disclosure	 (timing,	
knowledge,	 level	 of	 detail,	 definition	 of	 essentiality,	 updating)	 and	 licensing	
commitments	 (FRAND	 vs.	 royalty-free,	 beneficiaries,	 duration,	 field	 of	 use,	
geographic	 scope,	 transfer	 with	 underlying	 patents,	 suspension	 of	 licenses,	
requirements	 that	 licensees	 license-back	 their	 own	 patents	 (reciprocity),	 and	 the	
patent	holder’s	ability	to	opt-out	of	granting	licenses	under	certain	circumstances).		
Many	 of	 these	 variants	 are	 also	 discussed	 in	 detail	 in	 ABA	 (2007),	 which	 was	
compiled	by	a	committee	of	experts	involved	in	standardization	activities.		Blind	et	
al.	 (2011)	 analyze	 the	 policies	 of	 22	 SSOs	 of	 varying	 sizes	 and	 geographic	 scope	
(including	one	SSO	based	in	China)	in	a	similar	fashion.		Baron	and	Spulber	(2015)	
code	the	policies	of	36	different	SSOs	in	the	ICT	sector	for	inclusion	of	various	key	
terms	 pertaining	 to	 patent	 disclosure	 and	 licensing,	 as	 well	 as	 other	 procedural	
aspects	 of	 SSO	 operation	 including	 voting	 mechanics,	 openness,	 and	 balance	 of	
interests.		CRA	(2016,	Ch.3)	maps	different	SSO	policy	provisions	(FRAND	licensing,	
ex	ante	disclosure	of	royalty	rates,	etc.)	to	underlying	economic	issues	(e.g.,	hold-p,	





	 The	 above	 studies	 present	 a	 wealth	 of	 information	 regarding	 the	 policy	
features	of	SSO.	 	Among	 the	most	notable	results	 is	 the	prevalence	of	SSO	policies	






















discussion	 of	 these	 licensing	 terms	 is	 beyond	 the	 scope	 of	 this	 review.	 Where	
litigation	 over	 FRAND	 terms	 has	 arisen,	 specific	 issues	 are	 discussed	 in	 greater	
detail	 in	 Part	 IV.B	 below.	 	 Comprehensive	 discussions	 of	 the	many	 diverse	 terms	





	 SSO	 patent	 policies,	 far	 from	 being	 static	 documents,	 are	 amended	 and	
adapted	with	some	regularity.	Tsai	and	Wright	(2015)	find	that	many	SSOs	amend	
their	 patent	 policies	 as	 frequently	 as	 once	 per	 year	 or	 more.	 	 Most	 of	 these	




four	 general	 trends	 in	 antitrust	 enforcement:	 patent	 ambush,24	excessive	 royalty	
rates,	 transfer	 of	 patents	 subject	 to	 SSO	 licensing	 commitments	 and	 attempts	 to	
obtain	injunctions	on	patents	subject	to	licensing	commitments.	She	finds	that	while	
the	 first	 two	 concerns	 (patent	 ambush	 and	 royalty	 rates)	 have	 largely	 been	
addressed	 by	 the	 SSOs	 studied,	 the	 last	 two	 concerns	 (patent	 transfer	 and	
injunctions),	which	have	emerged	more	recently,	have	not	yet	been	addressed	fully.	
Tsai	and	Wright	(2015)	study	SSO	policy	amendments	pertaining	to	licensing	rules	
and	disclosure	at	11	SSOs.	They	rate	 the	amendments	based	on	 their	 reduction	of	
ambiguity	 in	 policy	 language	 (significant	 reduction,	 moderate	 reduction,	 no	
reduction,	 increase	 in	ambiguity)	and	 find	a	gradual	reduction	 in	policy	ambiguity	





general	 strengthening	 of	 SSO	 licensing	 requirements	 over	 time,	 with	 four	 SSOs	
moving	 to	royalty-free	or	non-assertion	requirements	after	permitting	royalties	 to	
be	charged	on	SEPs,	and	two	moving	to	a	mandatory	licensing	requirement	from	no	
licensing	 obligation	 at	 all.	 	 They	 observe	 no	 significant	modification	 to	 disclosure	





	 A	 few	 recent	 SSO	 patent	 policy	 amendments	 have	 generated	 significant	
controversy.	 The	 first	 of	 these	 involved	 VMEbus	 International	 Trade	 Association	
																																																								




VITA	 developed	 a	 draft	 patent	 policy	 amendment	 requiring	 that	 its	 participants	
disclose	 not	 only	 patents	 essential	 to	 the	 implementation	 of	 VITA	 standards,	 but	
also	the	maximum	royalty	rates	they	would	charge	for	those	patents	(a	so-called	“ex	
ante”	licensing	disclosure	policy	–	see	Part	V.A,	below).	VITA	submitted	its	proposed	
policy	 amendment	 to	 the	 U.S.	 Department	 of	 Justice,	 which	 issued	 a	 favorable	
business	review	letter	approving	the	policy	as	proposed	(DOJ	2006).		Nevertheless,	
one	 of	 VITA’s	 founding	 members	 objected	 to	 the	 change	 and	 withdrew	 from	 the	
organization	as	a	result	(Contreras	(2013a)).		A	dispute	ensued	in	which	opponents	
led	an	unsuccessful	campaign	to	have	VITA’s	ANSI	accreditation	revoked.25		Within	
the	 next	 several	 months,	 both	 IEEE	 and	 ETSI	 also	 adopted	 ex	 ante	 licensing	
disclosure	policies.	 	However,	due	 to	 internal	opposition,	 these	 two	SSOs	made	ex	




	 In	 2015,	 the	 IEEE	 adopted	 another	 set	 of	 major	 policy	 revisions.	 These	
included	various	clarifications	regarding	the	meaning	of	the	licensing	commitments	
made	 to	 IEEE,	 limiting	 the	 ability	 of	 participants	 to	 seek	 injunctive	 relief	 against	
willing	licensees,	requiring	commitments	by	transferees	of	committed	patents,	and	
permitting	the	arbitration	of	disputes	over	licensing	terms	(IEEE	(2015)).		The	DOJ	
approved	 these	 amendments	 as	 having	 “the	 potential	 to	 benefit	 competition	 and	
consumers	 by	 facilitating	 licensing	 negotiations,	 mitigating	 hold	 up	 and	 royalty	
stacking,	and	promoting	competition	among	technologies	for	inclusion	in	standards”			
(DOJ	 (2015)).	Nevertheless,	 there	was	strong	opposition	 to	 the	amendments,	both	
from	industry	and	commentators,	much	of	which	focused	on	the	DOJ’s	approval	of	







be	 sufficiently	 adverse	 to	 their	 interests	 to	 outweigh	 the	 benefits	 of	membership.		
Several	 authors	 have	 attempted	 to	 correlate	 SSO	 patent	 policy	 terms	 with	 firm	
decisions	 to	 participate	 in	 collaborative	 standardization	 activities	 and	 to	 model	
competition	 for	 membership	 among	 SSOs	 by	 means	 of	 differentiated	 policy	
documents.	
	




25 Despite opposition by a vocal minority, both the approval vote at VITA (35-2 in favor of the 
amendments, 12 abstaining) and survey data compiled by Contreras (2013a) indicate that a substantial 
majority of VITA members supported the amendments. 
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requirements	 imposed	by	SSOs.	These	 results,	however,	 are	not	necessarily	borne	
out	 by	 more	 focused	 studies	 of	 firms	 in	 the	 ICT	 sector,	 in	 which	 the	 value	 of	
participating	 in	 SSOs	 is	 perceived	 to	 be	 high	 (Delacey	 et	 al.	 (2006)).	 Lerner	 and	
Tirole	 (2006)	develop	 a	model,	 supported	by	 interviews	with	 SSO	participants,	 in	
which	 differing	 SSO	 rules	 regarding	 the	 disclosure	 and	 licensing	 of	 patents	 may	
impact	 an	 organization’s	 choice	 of	which	 SSO	 to	 join.	 	 That	 is,	 they	 view	 SSOs	 as	






	 Two	 recent	 case	 studies	 have	 examined	 the	 effects	 of	 specific	 SSO	 patent	
policy	 changes	 on	 SSO	 membership.	 	 Contreras	 (2013a)	 tested	 predictions	 that	
VITA’s	 adoption	 of	 a	mandatory	 ex	ante	 licensing	 disclosure	 policy	 (see	 Part	 III.C	
above)	would	drive	members	 from	the	organization.	 	He	 finds	that,	other	 than	the	
single	member	 that	most	 strenuously	 objected	 to	 the	 policy	 change,	 no	members	




SEPs.	 He	 finds	 that,	 following	 the	 OASIS	 policy	 amendment,	 overall	 membership	
levels	 dropped	 and	 member	 composition	 shifted,	 with	 the	 number	 of	 software	
producers	 decreasing	 and	 the	 number	 of	 research	 organizations	 and	 systems	






	 As	 discussed	 in	 Section	 III	 above,	 many	 SSOs	 have	 adopted	 policies	 that	
require	 their	 participants	 to	 disclose	 patents	 that	 are	 essential	 to	 the	 SSO’s	
standards,	and/or	to	license	those	patents	to	others	on	terms	that	are	either	royalty-
free	 (RF)	 or	 subject	 to	 FRAND	 royalties.	 Disputes	 and	 enforcement	 actions	
concerning	SSO	patent	policies	have	generally	arisen	in	two	waves:	the	first,	roughly	
from	the	mid-1990s	 to	 the	mid-2000s,	dealing	with	 the	scope	and	contours	of	 the	










mid-1990s	 to	 the	 mid-2000s.26		 Of	 these,	 Dell,	 Rambus	 (2008)	 and	 Unocal	 were	
enforcement	 actions	 brought	 by	 the	 FTC	 against	 patent	 holders	 for	 allegedly	
anticompetitive	 conduct	 in	 violating	 SSO	 disclosure	 requirements,	 and	 Rambus	
(2003)	 and	 Qualcomm	 were	 private	 actions	 in	 which	 the	 patent	 holder’s	 alleged	
violation	 of	 SSO	 disclosure	 rules	 was	 raised	 either	 as	 a	 defense	 to	 patent	
infringement	or	as	an	affirmative	private	antitrust	claim.		In	each	of	these	cases,	an	
SSO’s	rules	were	alleged	to	require	disclosure	of	SEPs	held	by	its	participants,	one	of	
the	 SSO’s	 participants	 failed	 to	 disclose	 one	 or	 more	 patents	 covering	 the	 SSO’s	
standards,	and	the	participant	thereafter	sought	to	exploit	those	patents	by	licensing	
or	enforcing	them	against	implementers	of	the	standard.	This	pattern	of	conduct	has	
been	 referred	 to	 as	 “patent	 ambush”	 or,	 as	 one	 commentator	 colorfully	 puts	 it,	
“snake	in	the	grass.”	Merges	and	Kuhn	(2009).	
	
One	of	 the	principal	 issues	raised	 in	each	case	was	the	degree	to	which	the	
relevant	SSO’s	policy	actually	required	disclosure	of	the	patents	in	question.		In	Dell,	
the	 Video Electronics Standards Association (VESA)	 required	 individual	 meeting	
attendees	 to	 certify	 that	 all	 known	 SEPs	were	 disclosed.	 	 Dell’s	 representative	 to	
VESA	signed	the	required	certification	but	did	not	disclose	any	patents.		When	Dell	
later	 sought	 to	 collect	 royalties	 under	 a	 patent	 covering	 the	 VL-bus	 standard,	 the	
FTC	brought	an	action	accusing	Dell	of	engaging	 in	unfair	methods	of	 competition	
under	 Section	 5	 of	 the	 FTC	 Act.	 	 The	 FTC	 action	 resulted	 in	 the	 entry	 of	 a	 1996	
consent	 decree	 permanently	 enjoining	 Dell	 from	 enforcing	 its	 VL-bus	 patents	
against	 any	 third	party.	 	The	Dell	 case	 is	 controversial,	 as	 there	was	no	allegation	
that	Dell’s	representative	to	VESA	knew	of	Dell’s	patent	when	the	VL-bus	standard	
was	 adopted.	 In	 response,	 SDO	 policies	 today	 often	 specify	 that	 searches	 of	
corporate	 patent	 portfolios	 are	 not	 required	 to	 comply	 with	 SSO	 disclosure	
requirements,	and	that	disclosure	be	 limited	to	 the	“knowledge”	of	 the	 individuals	
participating	 in	 standards	 development	 at	 the	 SSO	 	 (ABA	 (2007),	 Bekkers	 and	
Updegrove	(2012)).	
	
The	Rambus	 and	Qualcomm	 disputes	 also	 centered	 on	 the	 language	 of	 SSO	
disclosure	 policies.	 	 In	 Rambus	 (2003),	 the	 Federal	 Circuit	 sharply	 criticized	 the	
patent	 policy	 of	 the	 Joint	 Electron	Device	 Engineering	 Council	 (JEDEC),	 an	 SSO	 in	
which	Rambus,	Inc.	participated	in	the	early	1990s.	Though	Rambus	was	accused	of	
concealing	 patents	 that	 it	 filed	 specifically	 to	 cover	 nascent	 JEDEC	 standards,	 the	
court	 declined	 to	 find	 that	 Rambus	 had	 committed	 fraud	 because	 JEDEC’s	 patent	
policy	 did	 not	 clearly	 impose	 a	 disclosure	 requirement.	 The	 court	 criticized	 the	
policy	 as	 suffering	 from	 “a	 staggering	 lack	 of	 defining	 details”	 that	 left	 SSO	
participants	 with	 only	 “vaguely	 defined	 expectations	 as	 to	 what	 they	 believe	 the	
policy	requires”.		The	court	concluded	that,	while	Rambus’s	attempt	surreptitiously	
to	 patent	 JEDEC	 standards	 might	 “impeach	 Rambus’s	 business	 ethics,	 the	 record	
does	not	 contain	substantial	evidence	 that	Rambus	breached	 its	duty	under	 the	…	
																																																								
26 Other cases that are discussed less frequently in the literature include Wang v. Mitsubishi, 860 F. 
Supp. 1448 (C.D. Cal. 1993) and Stambler v. Diebold, 1988 WL 95479 (E.D.N.Y. 1988).  For a brief 















	 2.	 Essentiality.	 	 A	 key	 element	 of	 all	 SSO	 policies	 that	 require	
either	 disclosure	 or	 licensing	 of	 SEPs	 is	 the	 manner	 in	 which	 patent	 claims	 are	
classified	 as	 “essential”	 to	 the	 relevant	 standard.	 The	 determination	 whether	 a	
particular	patent	is,	indeed,	essential	to	a	particular	standard	is	typically	left	to	the	
patent	 holder.	 Bekkers	 and	 Updegrove	 (2012).	 Due	 to	 resource	 constraints,	 SSOs	
rarely	review	or	validate	their	participants’	determinations	of	essentiality.28			
	
Compounding	 the	 problem	 of	 unverified	 self-reporting	 is	 the	 range	 of	
definitions	 of	 essentiality	 used	 by	 different	 SSOs.	 Bekkers	 and	 Updegrove	 (2012)	
identify	 thirteen	 different	 features	 of	 SSO	 essentiality	 definitions	 which	 varied	




technical	 matter,	 is	 the	 only	 commercially	 feasible	 way	 that	 the	 standard	 can	 be	
implemented	 (i.e.,	 considering	 cost,	 efficiency,	 reliability,	 manufacturability,	 etc.)	
(commercial	 essentiality).	 ABA	 (2007),	 Bekkers	 and	Updegrove	 (2012),	 Contreras	
(2013b),	Kesan	and	Hayes	(2014).	
	
	 Given	the	 incentives	 that	 firms	have	to	obtain	and	disclose	patents	 that	are	
essential	to	standards,	potential	penalties	for	failing	to	disclose	potentially	essential	
																																																								
27  In a subsequent action, the FTC found Rambus liable, among other things, for attempted 
monopolization in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act and deceptive conduct under Section 5 of the 
FTC Act (Rambus (2008)). The FTC’s decision, however, was reversed by the Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia, which held that Rambus’s attempt to increase prices following adoption of a standard 
did not amount to anticompetitive conduct unless such conduct also resulted in adoption of the standard, 
which was not shown. This decision has been criticized, both on the basis of its antitrust analysis and as a 
matter of public policy.  Citations to literature discussing the case are collected in Contreras (2011). 
28 This situation is different than that observed in patent pools, in which significant up-front costs are 
incurred to verify the “essentiality” of all patents proposed to be included in the pool in order to comply 
with relevant antitrust requirements.  Contreras (2013b), Lundqvist (2014).  Estimated costs of such 
essentiality analyses are presented in CRA (2016) (see note 21, above). 
29 Some of these variations involved the degree to which copyrights and other intellectual property, in 




by	 SSOs,	 some	 authors	 suggest	 that	 the	 many	 patents	 disclosed	 as	 essential	 to	
standards	 are	 not	 actually	 necessary	 for	 the	 implementation	 of	 those	 standards.	
This	phenomenon	is	known	as	“over-disclosure”.	 	Goodman	and	Myers	(2005)	and	
Fairfield	 (2007,	 2010)	 find	 that only	 27,	 28	 and	 50	 percent	 of	 patent	 families	
declared	 “essential”	 to	 ETSI’s	 GSM,	WCDMA	 and	 LTE	 standards,	 respectively,	 are	
actually	 essential	 to	 implementation	 of	 those	 standards.31		 Cyber	 Creative	 (2013)	
independently	 evaluated	 a	 sample	 of	 2,129	 SEPs	 declared	 essential	 to	 the	 LTE	
standard	(representing	36%	of	the	5,919	total	declared	SEPs).		It	found	that	56%	of	
the	sampled	SEPs	were	“truly”	essential	 to	the	standard,	while	29%	were	partially	
essential	 and	15%	were	not	essential	 at	all.	 	The	 investigators	 then	calculated	 the	
ratio	of	essential	 to	non-essential	declared	SEPs	 for	each	major	contributor	 to	 the	
standard,	 finding	 that	 several	 firms	 including	Apple,	Alcatel-Lucent,	 Freescale	 and	




	 Interviews	conducted	by	Blind	et	al.	 (2011)	also	point	 to	widespread	over-
disclosure	 of	 patents	 at	 SSOs.	 As	 noted	 above,	 CRA’s	 (2016)	 interviews	 identified	
over-disclosure	as	a	significant	area	of	concern	for	stakeholders	in	standardization.	
	
Challenges	 to	 claims	 of	 essentiality	 can	 be	 raised	 in	 litigation	 if	 and	when	
those	 patents	 are	 asserted	 by	 their	 owners.	 One	 such	 challenge	 occurred	 in	













30 Cases such as Dell, Rambus and Qualcomm (see Section IV.A above) gave a strong message to 
industry that failing to disclose standards-essential patents could be viewed by antitrust enforcement 
authorities as deceptive and anticompetitive conduct.  There appears to be no similar legal disincentive to 
over-disclosing patents to an SSO, though it is theoretically possible that intentional over-disclosure could 
support a claim of fraud or deception, especially if the patent holder sought to charge royalties on patents 
that were not essential to the standard. Contreras (2013b). 
31 The methodology of the first such study has been critiqued in an unpublished working paper by 
Martin and DeMeyer (2006). 
32 IEEE has a “commercial essentiality” requirement. IEEE (2015). 














worldwide	 FRAND-related	 litigation	 can	 be	 found	 in	 Pentheroudakis	 and	 Baron	
(2017).	
	
	 	 1.	 Royalty	 Rates.	 	 Much	 FRAND	 litigation	 centers	 on	 whether	 a	
SEP	 holder	 has	 breached	 its	 FRAND	 licensing	 commitment	 by	 charging	 (or	
demanding)	 royalties	 that	 are	 too	 high	 to	 be	 considered	 “reasonable”	 under	 the	
relevant	SSO’s	policy.	 	Such	claims	may	be	raised	either	in	an	affirmative	breach	of	
contract	 action	 by	 an	 implementer	 seeking	 a	 license	 under	 those	 SEPs	 (Microsoft	
(2013),	 Apple	 (2012))	 or	 as	 an	 affirmative	 defense	 to	 an	 infringement	 action	
brought	by	the	SEP	holder	(Ericsson	(2014)).	
	
	 The	 analysis	 of	 “reasonable”	 royalty	 rates	 for	 purposes	 of	 FRAND	
commitments	has	been	substantially	informed	by	a	long	line	of	cases	and	extensive	
analysis	of	reasonable	royalty	damages	in	patent	infringement	cases.		This	analysis	
generally	 takes	as	 its	starting	point	 the	15-factor	analytical	 framework	 introduced	
in	 Georgia-Pacific	 (1970),	 as	 modified	 to	 accommodate	 perceived	 unique	
characteristics	 of	 FRAND	 commitments.	 Microsoft	 (2013),	 	 Innovatio	 (2013),	
Ericsson	 (2014).	 A	 detailed	 analysis	 of	 these	 cases	 and	 their	 royalty	 calculation	
methodologies	 can	 be	 found	 in	 Pentheroudakis	 and	 Baron	 (2017),	 Cotter	 (2014),	
Layne-Farrar	and	Wong	(2014),	NRC	(2013)	and	Sidak	(2013).			
	










a	result	of	evidence	presented	 in	 litigated	cases.	 	The	court	 in	Microsoft	 (2013),	 in	
particular,	 conducted	 a	 detailed	 analysis	 of	 numerous	 “comparable”	 licensing	
																																																								
34 For implications of this lack of specificity on the contract law analysis of FRAND commitments, see 
Lemley (2002) and Contreras (2015a). 
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arrangements	 to	 determine	 FRAND	 royalty	 rates	 and	 ranges	 for	 two	 important	
standards	 (ITU’s	 H.264	 audio-video	 encoding	 standard	 and	 IEEE’s	 802.11	 Wi-Fi	
standard).	 These	 comparable	 licenses	 included	 both	 bilateral	 license	 agreements	
and	 licenses	 granted	 by	 patent	 pools.	 Likewise,	 the	 court	 in	 Innovatio	 (2013)	
considered	 various	 comparable	 license	 agreements	 to	 benchmark	 royalty	 rates	 in	
making	its	FRAND	determination.			Less	data	on	industry	royalty	rates	emerges	from	




in	 litigation	 has	 been	 the	 subject	 of	 some	 controversy,	 with	 some	 commentators	
supporting	 the	 use	 of	 comparable	 licenses	 as	 the	 best	 available	 evidence	 of	 the	
royalty	rates	that	the	parties	would	have	agreed	in	a	hypothetical	negotiation	(Sidak	
(2016),	Geradin	 and	Layne-Farrar	 (2011)).	Others,	 however,	 express	 concern	 that	
license	 agreements	 between	 different	 parties	 are	 unreliable,	 non-transparent	 and	




conducted	 in	standards-heavy	 industries.	 	Stasik	(2010)	compiles	royalty	rates	 for	
patents	 essential	 to	 the	 ETSI	 4G	 LTE	 standard,	 Armstrong,	 Mueller	 and	 Syrett	
(2014)	report	known	and	estimated	patent	royalty	rates	for	the	various	components	
of	 a	 smart	 phone,	 and	Mallinson	 (2015),	 refuting	 Armstrong,	 Mueller	 and	 Syrett,	
compiles	 data	 regarding	 publicly	 announced	 licensing	 rates	 for	 various	 standards	
included	 in	 mobile	 wireless	 devices.	 	 Blind	 et	 al.	 (2011),	 rather	 than	 relying	 on	





	 	 2.	 Royalty	 Base	 and	 Apportionment.	 Closely	 related	 to	 the	
question	of	royalty	rate	in	FRAND	discussions	is	that	of	royalty	“base”,	the	amount	
to	 which	 the	 royalty	 rate	 is	 applied.	 	 Royalty	 base	 is	 a	 critical	 variable	 in	 patent	
licensing	discussions,	as	it	directly	impacts	the	revenue	received	by	the	licensor,	and	
it	 has	 recently	 become	 the	 subject	 of	 U.S.	 litigation	 over	 the	 proper	 measure	 of	
“reasonable	 royalty”	 damages	 in	 patent	 infringement	 suits	 (see	 Chapter	 x,	 this	
volume).	 	 The	 crux	of	 the	problem	 is	 that	hundreds	or	 even	 thousands	of	 patents	
often	cover	a	single	technology	product.	 	Though	each	such	patent	typically	claims	
only	 a	 small	 subset	 of	 the	 overall	 product’s	 functionality,	 in	 commercial	 license	








	 Under	 longstanding	 U.S.	 precedent,	 “reasonable	 royalty”	 patent	 damages	
must	be	“based	on	the	incremental	value	that	the	patented	invention	adds	to	the	end	
product”	 (Ericsson	 (2014).	 This	 incremental	 value	 approach	 requires	 the	 court	 to	




instruct	 them	 to	 apply	 the	 determined	 royalty	 to	 the	 “smallest	 saleable	 patent	
practicing	 unit”	 [SSPPU]	 of	 a	 product”	 Ericsson	 (2014)36.	 In	 contrast,	 royalties	
should	be	payable	on	the	entire	market	value	of	the	end	product	(the	“entire	market	




SSPPU	 principle	 to	 cases	 involving	 standardized	 products.	 In	 its	 2015	 policy	
amendments,	IEEE	stated	that	the	determination	of	reasonable	royalty	rates	should	
include	consideration	of	the	contribution	made	by	the	patented	feature	to	the	value	
of	 the	SSPPU	(IEEE	2015).	 	 In	 its	approval	of	 the	amendments,	 the	DOJ	noted	that	
such	considerations	support	 the	appropriate	valuation	of	 technologies	subject	 to	a	
FRAND	 commitment	 (DOJ	 2015).	 Nevertheless,	 numerous	 commentators	 have	
criticized	 the	 application	 of	 the	 SSPPU	 principle,	 particularly	 in	 cases	 involving	
standardized	 products.	 	 Petit	 (2016),	 Teece	 and	 Sherry	 (2016)	 and	 Sidak	 (2014)	
argue	 that	 the	 SSPPU	 rule	 runs	 contrary	 to	 commercial	 licensing	 practice	 and	
needlessly	 increases	 transaction	 costs	 and	 uncertainty	 in	 licensing	 transactions.	
CRA	 (2016)	 argues	 that	 different	 royalty	 bases	 may	 be	 appropriate	 in	 different	









		 	 3.	 Nondiscrimination.	 	 While	 much	 of	 the	 debate	 concerning	
FRAND	 licensing	has	centered	on	 the	 “reasonableness”	of	 royalty	 rates,	 increasing	
attention	has	focused	on	the	“nondiscrimination”	prong	of	the	FRAND	commitment.		
The	 issue	 has	 arisen	 largely	 in	 connection	with	 some	 SEP	holders’	 desire	 to	 deny	
licenses	 to	 “upstream”	component	vendors	 in	order	 to	collect	 royalties	 from	more	
lucrative	“downstream”	vendors.	
	
	 In	 general,	 a	 patent	 holder	may	 choose	 to	 license	 its	 patent,	 and	 charge	 a	
royalty,	 to	any	producer	 in	 the	supply	chain	 for	a	product,	or	 to	 the	product’s	end	
																																																								









of	 the	wireless	 chipset	 that	 embodies	 that	 standard,	 the	manufacturer	 of	 a	 smart	
phone	that	incorporates	that	chipset,	or	the	consumer	who	uses	the	smart	phone’s	
wireless	 communications	 capability.	 	 Thus,	 the	 patent	 holder’s	 hypothetical	 2%	
royalty	on	the	sale	price	of	the	$600	smart	phone	would	yield	the	patent	holder	$12,	
while	 the	 same	 2%	 royalty	 applied	 to	 the	 $50	 wireless	 chipset	 inside	 the	 smart	
phone	would	yield	the	patent	holder	only	$1.	 	Yet	 if	 the	patent	holder	 licenses	the	
chipset	vendor,	the	patent	is	“exhausted”	and	no	royalty	can	be	charged	to	the	smart	
phone	manufacturer	 that	 incorporates	 the	chipset	 into	 its	phone,	or	 the	consumer	
who	uses	the	phone.38	
	
	 This	 is	 the	classic	supply	chain	 issue	 faced	by	patent	holders.	To	address	 it	
and	maximize	royalty	revenue,	patent	holders	often	seek	to	license	the	entity	that	is	
furthest	 “downstream,”	or	 selling	products	 at	 the	highest	price,	while	declining	 to	
grant	 licenses	 to	 suppliers	 of	 low-priced	 intermediate	 components.	 While	 this	
practice	is	within	a	patent	holder’s	rights	in	the	ordinary	course	of	business,	it	is	not	
clear	 that	 the	 practice	 is	 permitted	 when	 patents	 are	 subject	 to	 a	 FRAND	
commitment.	 That	 is,	 if	 a	 FRAND	 commitment	 implies	 that	 a	 patent	 holder	must	
grant	or	at	least	offer	licenses	to	all	who	request	them,	then	refusal	to	grant	a	license	
to	 a	 low-value	 component	 vendor	 could	 constitute	 impermissible	 “discrimination”	





the	 position	 that,	 absent	 express	 SSO	 policy	 language	 to	 the	 contrary,	 they	 are	
permitted	 to	 choose	 their	 licensees	 under	 their	 FRAND	 commitments	 (Ericsson	
(2013)).	 They	 argue,	 among	 other	 things,	 that	 the	 purpose	 of	 the	 FRAND	
“nondiscrimination”	requirement	is	to	ensure	that	all	licenses	that	are	granted	have	
comparable,	 if	 not	 identical,	 terms.	 	 While	 the	 question	 whether	 or	 not	 FRAND	
commitments	 generally	 imply	 the	 licensing	 of	 all	 applicants	 remains	 open,	 most	
commentators	 agree	 that	 some	 variation	 among	 FRAND	 licensing	 terms	 will	 be	
tolerated	 by	 the	 “non-discrimination”	 requirement,	 and	 that	 all	 FRAND	 licenses	
need	not	be	 identical	 (Layne-Farrar	 (2010),	Gilbert	 (2011),	Carlton	and	Shampine	
(2013),	Contreras	 (2015b)).	 	Gilbert	 (2011)	proposes	 that	greater	 transparency	of	
FRAND	licensing	terms	may	ensure	greater	compliance	with	the	non-discrimination	
																																																								
37 Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008). 
38 Of course, from an economic standpoint, the particular point in the supply chain at which a royalty is 
charged is irrelevant, as the royalty rate can be adjusted to yield an equivalent charge no matter what the 
royalty base is.  Teece, Grindley and Sherry (2013). 
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requirement,	 a	 requirement	 that	 has,	 in	 some	 cases,	 been	 alleged	 to	 have	 been	
breached	(Qualcomm	(2008)).	
	
	 	 4.	 Injunctions.		Much	of	the	global	controversy	concerning	FRAND	
licensing	 relates	 to	 a	 SEP	 holder’s	 ability	 to	 seek	 injunctive	 relief	 to	 prevent	 the	
ongoing	 infringement	 of	 a	 SEP	 after	 a	 FRAND	 commitment	 has	 been	made.	 	 The	
question	 arises	 because	 a	 SEP	 holder	 that	 has	 made	 a	 FRAND	 commitment	 has	
agreed,	 in	 theory,	 to	 grant	 licenses	 under	 its	 SEPs	 to	 implementers	 of	 relevant	
standards.	 	 Seeking	an	 injunction	 to	prevent	such	an	 implementer	 from	practicing	
the	 SEP	 would	 therefor	 be	 contrary	 to	 the	 SEP	 holder’s	 FRAND	 obligation.	 	 An	
argument	 can	 thus	 be	 made	 that	 a	 SEP	 holder	 subject	 to	 a	 FRAND	 commitment	
should	not	be	permitted,	as	a	matter	of	remedies	law,	to	seek	an	injunction	against	




address	 this	 question	 and	 is	 summarized	 in	NRC	 (2013),	 Cotter	 (2014)	 and	 Sidak	
(2015a).	 	Some	of	the	principal	 legal	and	theoretical	arguments	against	permitting	
such	injunctions	are	outlined	in	Lemley	and	Shapiro	(2007),	Lemley	(2007),	Miller	
(2007),	 Shapiro	 (2010),	 Michel	 (2011)	 and	 Chien	 and	 Lemley	 (2012),	 while	
arguments	 against	 the	 limitation	of	 such	 injunctions	 can	be	 found	 in	 Sidak	 (2008,	
2015a),	 Epstein,	 Keiff	 and	 Spulber	 (2012),	 Camesaca	 (2013)	 and	 Layne-Farrar	
(2014).	
	
	 The	 issuance	 of	 injunctions	 on	 FRAND-committed	 patents	 has	 now	 been	
considered	 by	 the	 U.S.	 federal	 courts	 (Apple	 (2014)),	 the	 International	 Trade	
Commission	(ITC)	(Samsung	ITC	(2013)),	the	FTC	(Motorola	and	Google	(2013)),	the	
European	 Commission	 (Samsung	 EC	 (2014))	 and	 the	 European	 Court	 of	 Justice	
(Huawei	 (2015)),	 and	 the	 courts	 and	 enforcement	 agencies	 of	 China,	 Japan	 and	
Korea.		While	there	is	still	some	disagreement	over	the	precise	standards	for	review,	
a	consensus	appears	to	be	forming	among	courts	and	agencies	that	making	a	FRAND	






	 Despite	 the	 surge	 of	 recent	 empirical	 work	 investigating	 the	 award	 of	
injunctive	 relief	 in	 patent	 cases	 generally	 (see	 Chapter	 x),	 relatively	 little	 of	 this	
work	 has	 focused	 on	 SEPs.	 	 This	 may	 be	 because,	 as	 some	 commentators	 have	
pointed	 out,	 few	 if	 any	 injunctions	 have	 been	 issued	 with	 respect	 to	 FRAND-
encumbered	SEPs.		Layne-Farrar	(2014b).	
	
	 Most	of	 the	debate	regarding	 the	appropriateness	of	 injunctive	relief	 in	 the	




significant	 amount	 of	 commentary	 has	 emerged	 in	 Europe	 in	 the	wake	 of	Huawei	
(2015),	but	the	case	and	its	aftermath	are	still	too	new	to	draw	any	firm	conclusions.		
For	 a	 discussion	 of	 the	 European	 case	 law	 following	Huawei,	 see	 Pentheroudakis	
and	Baron	(2017).	
	
	 On	 the	policy	side,	 IEEE	was	 the	 first	major	SSO	 to	amend	 its	patent	policy	
















patents	 that	 are	 essential	 to	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 SSO’s	 standards.	 	 Though	
such	policies	 often	permit	 patent	 holders	 to	 grant	 licenses	 on	FRAND	 terms,	 very	
few	require	the	patent	holder	to	disclose	in	advance	(ex	ante)	the	royalty	rates	that	





	 In	 the	early	2000s,	 some	commentators	began	 to	caution	 that	 royalty	 rates	
left	 unspecified	 during	 standardization	 could	 lead	 to	 hold-up	 situations	
characterized	 by	 excessive	 royalty	 demands	 following	 industry	 lock-in	 to	 a	
particular	 standard	 (Ohana,	 Hansen	 and	 Shah	 (2003),	 Skitol	 (2005),	 Updegrove	
(2006),	 Lemley	 (2007)).	 	 As	 a	 result,	 proposals	 were	made	 at	 several	 large	 SSOs	
including	 IEEE	 and	 ETSI,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 smaller	 VMEBus	 International	 Trade	
Association	 (VITA),	 to	 require	 the	 disclosure	 of	 royalty	 information	 prior	 to	
approval	of	a	standard	(Contreras	(2013a)).	 	Due	to	 internal	opposition	as	well	as	
the	 specter	 of	 liability	 for	 encouraging	 anticompetitive	 price	 collusion	 (Sidak	
(2009)),	IEEE	and	ETSI	amended	their	patent	policies	to	permit,	but	not	require,	the	
disclosure	 of	 royalty	 and	 other	 licensing	 information	 (see	 Part	 III.C).	 VITA,	 in	
contrast,	 proceeded	 with	 its	 policy	 amendments	 requiring	 mandatory	 ex	 ante	
disclosure	of	maximum	patent	licensing	rates.	 	Both	VITA	and	IEEE	requested,	and	
received,	 business	 review	 letters	 from	 the	 DOJ	 approving	 their	 proposed	 policy	
amendments	(DOJ	(2006,	2007)).	There	was	at	 least	one	coordinated	attempt	by	a	
group	of	European	network	operators	 to	 reveal	maximum	aggregate	 royalty	 rates	
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the	 organization	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 adoption	 of	 the	 ex	 ante	 policy.	 	 Some	
commentators	predicted	that	the	adoption	of	ex	ante	disclosure	policies	would	have	
the	 effect	 of	 driving	 other	 members	 away	 from	 SSOs	 adopting	 such	 policies,	 in	
addition	 to	 reducing	 the	 efficiency	 and	 quality	 of	 the	 standards	 development	
process	 at	 such	 SSOs	 (Skitol	 (2005),	 Tapia	 (2010),	 Herman	 (2010)).	 Contreras	
(2013a)	 empirically	 tested	 these	 predictions	 at	 VITA,	 IEEE	 and	 IETF,	 a	 large	 SSO	
that	 permits	 voluntary	 ex	 ante	 disclosures,	 finding	 no	 evidence	 of	 the	 predicted	
process	deterioration.		In	interviews	with	VITA	participants,	there	was	moderate	to	




	 Potential	 antitrust	 liability	 has	 often	 been	 raised	 when	 ex	 ante	 disclosure	
policies	are	discussed.	Specifically,	requiring	a	patent	holder	to	disclose	its	licensing	
terms	 ex	 ante	 could	 enable	 potential	 licensees	 (implementers	 of	 a	 standard)	 to	
collectively	 exert	 anticompetitive	 pressure	 on	 the	 patent	 holder	 to	 reduce	 its	
royalties	 toward	 zero,	 resulting	 in	 the	 devaluation	 of	 patents	 covering	 the	
standard.39	Sidak	(2008).	This	type	of	improper	buyer	cartel	is	avoided	when	patent	
holders	are	permitted	 to	negotiate	 license	 terms	with	 implementers	on	a	bilateral	
basis,	constrained	only	by	FRAND	guidelines.	Given	these	arguments,	Skitol	(2005),	
Lemley	 and	 Shapiro	 (2007)	 and	 Contreras	 (2013b)	 propose	 that	 antitrust	




likely	 due	 to	 a	 combination	 of	 inertia,	 antitrust	 concerns	 and	 internal	 opposition	
from	patent	holders.	 	 Contreras	 (2013a).	Given	 these	market	 realities,	 Lerner	 and	
Tirole	 (2015)	propose	 that	SSOs	be	mandated	by	 law	to	require	patent	holders	 to	





	 As	 discussed	 in	 Section	 II.G.2,	 the	 principal	 risk	 associated	 with	 royalty	
stacking	 is	 that	 individual	 patent	 holders,	 each	 acting	 to	maximize	 its	 own	 profit,	
																																																								
39 Contreras (2013a) finds no evidence that VITA’s mandatory ex ante disclosure policy caused patent 
holders to reduce their requested royalty rates. 
40 Ganglmair, Froeb and Werden (2012) propose that optimal hold-up avoidance and innovation could 
be achieved if patent holders and implementers entered into formal “option-to-license” contracts before the 
implementer makes investments in the standardized technology.  While this solution is theoretically 
attractive, significant transaction costs are involved in licensing negotiations, making the widespread use of 
such pre-implementation contracts unlikely.  
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will	 in	 the	aggregate	charge	a	cumulative	royalty	 that	 is	above	efficient	 levels.	 	To	
address	 this	 risk,	 proposals	 have	 been	 made	 to	 cap	 the	 aggregate	 royalties	
chargeable	with	 respect	 to	 a	 given	 standard	 or	 product.	 	 Some	 firms,	 in	 order	 to	





caps	 at	 ETSI	 for	 3G	 and	4G	 telecommunications	 standards,	 but	 these	 efforts	were	
ultimately	unsuccessful	as	major	patent	holders	were	unwilling	to	participate.	
	
	 In	 addition	 to	 these	 industry	 efforts,	 commentators	 have	 proposed	 more	
coordinated	 approaches	 to	 containing	 royalties	 at	 the	 SSO	 level.	 Lemley	 (2007)	
proposes	 a	 “step-down”	 royalty	 structure	 in	which	 each	 successive	 patent	 holder	
seeking	 to	 charge	 royalties	 on	 a	 particular	 standard	would	 be	 entitled	 to	 seek	 an	
increasingly	diminished	royalty.	Contreras	(2013b)	proposes	collective	agreements	
among	 SSO	 members	 on	 aggregate	 royalty	 caps	 for	 particular	 standards,	 with	
proceeds	divided	among	SEP	holders	and	meaningful	penalties	for	over-disclosure.	









	 Much	 recent	 litigation	 concerning	 standards	 and	 patents	 revolves	 around	
appropriate	 levels	 for,	 and	 methods	 of	 calculating,	 FRAND	 royalty	 rates.	 	 These	
challenges,	as	well	as	the	risk	of	patent	hold-up	by	SSO	participants,	are	alleviated	if	
patent	holders	covenant	not	 to	assert	 their	standards-essential	patents,	or	commit	
to	 license	 them	 on	 a	 royalty-free	 basis.	 	 Such	 royalty-free	 licensing	 requirements	
might	 be	 commercially	 advantageous	 in	 some	 settings,	 as	 when	 standards	
developers	 value	 widespread	 interoperability	 more	 highly	 than	 patent-based	
revenue	generation	 (Blind	et	al.	 (2011),	Updegrove	 (2012),	Contreras	 (2016a))	or	
wish	 to	 promote	 the	 adoption	 of	 a	 new	 technology	 platform	 or	 infrastructure	
(Contreras	(2015c).	
	







41 Rysman and Simcoe (2011) propose a model in which SEPs would be licensed at FRAND rates for 
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develop	 technically	 adequate	 standards	 without	 the	 inclusion	 of	 at	 least	 some	
royalty-bearing	patented	technology.		In	this	vein,	Choi	and	Jang	(2014)	discuss	the	
challenges	 of	 developing	 a	 royalty-free	 codec.	 Finally,	 Chiao,	 Lerner	 and	 Tirole	
(2007)	 observe	 that	 SSOs	 with	 royalty-free	 licensing	 requirements	 tend	 to	 have	
fewer	 patent	 disclosure	 requirements,	 as	 the	 effort	 of	 identifying	 and	 disclosing	







coded,	 Baron	 and	 Spulber	 (2015)	 identify	 5	 that	 require	 royalty-free	 licensing	 or	
patent	 non-assertion,	 at	 least	 at	 the	working	 group	 level.	 They	 also	 find	 that	 four	




include	 the	 Worldwide	 Web	 Consortium	 (W3C),	 the	 Bluetooth	 Special	 Interest	
Group,	 the	 HDMI	 forum,	 and	 the	 USB	 Forum.	 Other	 groups,	 such	 as	 software	
standards	 developer	 OASIS,	 permit	 technical	 committees	 to	 determine,	 upon	
formation,	whether	they	will	require	FRAND	or	royalty-free	licensing	commitments	
from	their	participants.	Bekkers	and	Updegrove	(2012)	find	that	of	83	active	OASIS	
committees,	 all	 had	 selected	 a	 royalty-free	 licensing	 approach,	 and	 none	 had	
selected	a	royalty-bearing	FRAND	licensing	approach.			
	
	 The	 above	 discussion	 relates	 to	 de	 jure	 royalty-free	 policies,	 which	 are	
imposed	by	SSOs	on	their	participants.		In	addition	to	de	jure	royalty-free	standards	,	
it	 is	 also	 possible	 that	 standards	 developed	 at	 SSOs	 permitting	 royalty-bearing	
FRAND	licensing	may,	as	a	practical	matter,	also	be	free	from	royalty	demands.		This	
could	 be	 because	 a	 standard	 is	 simply	 not	 covered	 by	 patents	 held	 by	 SSO	
participants,	thus	avoiding	the	need	for	any	licenses	at	all,	or	because	the	holders	of	
patents	 covering	 the	 standard	 have	 elected	 not	 to	 assert	 those	 patents	 or	 seek	
licenses	 from	 implementers.	 	 The	 second	 scenario	 arises	 frequently	 in	 the	 case	 of	
IETF,	 which	 requires	 neither	 FRAND	 nor	 royalty-free	 licensing,	 but	 expressly	
prefers	 standards	 that	 are	 available	 on	 a	 royalty-free	 basis	 (Contreras	 (2016a)).		




	 Another	 instance	of	 royalty-free	 standards	usage	 is	 associated	with	 the	 so-
called	 “sleeping	 dog”	 phenomenon:	 some	 patent	 holders	 simply	 do	 not	 wish	 to	
																																																																																																																																																																					
an initial period, after which licenses would become royalty-free.  This Non-Assertion After Specified 
Time, or “NAASTy”, pricing model could enable innovators to recoup development costs, while thereafter 
promoting widespread adoption of a standard and eliminating disputes regarding FRAND royalty rates. 
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Morton	 and	 Shelanski	 (2013).	 The	 FTC	 and	 European	 Commission	 have	 also	
recognized	 arbitration	 as	 a	 suitable	 method	 for	 resolving	 SEP-related	 disputes.		
Mororola	and	Google	(2013),	Samsung	EC	(2014).	
	
	 As	 a	 matter	 of	 implementation,	 Lemley	 and	 Shapiro	 (2013)	 propose	 that	
disputes	 regarding	 FRAND	 royalty	 rates	 be	 settled	 by	 binding	 “final	 offer”	 or	
“baseball”	arbitration.	In	such	proceedings,	each	party	provides	the	arbitrator	with	a	
sealed	 “final	 offer,”	 of	 which	 the	 arbitrator	 must	 choose	 only	 one,	 without	
modification.	 This	 approach	 is	 supported	 by	 CRA	 (2016,	 p.80),	 who	 offer	 the	
alternative	 of	 ‘night	 baseball’,	 in	 which	 the	 arbitrators	 are	 not	 informed	 of	 the	
parties’	offers,	but	must	make	an	independent	assessment	of	the	royalty	level,	after	
which	 the	 royalty	 is	 set	 at	 the	 party’s	 offer	 that	 is	 closest	 to	 the	 arbitrator’s	
assessment.	 Larouche,	 Padilla	 and	 Taffet	 (2014)	 challenge	 baseball	 arbitration	 as	
unnecessary	 and	 likely	 to	 undermine	 the	 standardization	 process.	 Contreras	 and	




	 A	 few	SSOs	have	 adopted	ADR	mechanisms	 in	 their	 rules	 and	policies.	The	
DVB	Forum	has	had	such	a	policy	 in	place	since	1995.	Eltzroth	(2008).	 	Contreras	




	 In	 addition	 to	 SSOs,	 several	 international	 arbitration	 bodies	 have	 begun	 to	
modify	 their	 practices	 and	 policies	 to	 accommodate	 proceedings	 concerning	 SEPs	
and	 standardization.	The	most	 ambitious	of	 these	has	been	 the	World	 Intellectual	











if	 an	SEP	 can	be	 sold	without	 transferring	 the	 commitment”	 (p.	 71).	Yet,	 the	 legal	
basis	for	the	transfer	of	such	commitments	is	not	entirely	clear.	
	
	 The	 FTC	 has	 taken	 the	 position	 that	 a	 party	 acquiring	 a	 SEP	 with	 the	
knowledge	of	a	prior	FRAND	commitment	must	abide	by	that	commitment,	and	that	
a	failure	to	do	so	constitutes	an	unfair	method	of	competition	in	violation	of	Section	
5	 of	 the	 FTC	 Act	 (N-Data	 (2008)).	 This	 matter	 was	 settled,	 however,	 before	 any	
judicial	ruling	on	the	question.	The	issue	arose	again	in	2011,	when	bankrupt	Nortel	
Networks,	 a	major	 contributor	 to	 several	SSOs,	proposed	 the	 sale	of	 its	 remaining	
assets,	 including	 approximately	 4,000	 patents,	 on	 a	 “free	 and	 clear”	 basis.	Nortel	
(2011).	Several	product	vendors,	together	with	IEEE,	argued	that	Nortel’s	“free	and	
clear”	sale	could	invalidate	patent	licensing	commitments	that	Nortel	had	previously	
made	 to	 SSOs.	 Ultimately,	 the	 purchaser	 of	 the	 patents,	 a	 consortium	 including	





in	 this	 regard.	 	 As	 a	 result,	 an	 increasing	 number	 of	 SSOs	 have	 required	 in	 their	
internal	 policies	 that	 participants	 that	 transfer	 SEPs	 as	 to	 which	 licensing	
commitments	have	been	made	must	ensure	that	those	commitments	are	binding	on	
successive	 owners	 of	 the	 SEPs.	 Bekkers	 and	 Updegrove	 (2012)	 catalog	 SSOs	 that	
impose	 such	 transfer	 requirements,	 and	NRC	 (2013)	 discusses	 the	 variety	 of	 SSO	
policy	 provisions	 that	 can	 be	 employed	 in	 this	 regard.	 The	 IEEE’s	 2015	 policy	
amendments	 are	 an	 example	 of	 such	 provisions.	 	 Most	 commentators	 who	 have	
considered	the	matter	support	the	implementation	of	voluntary	policy	mechanisms	
to	ensure	the	binding	nature	of	SEP	licensing	commitments	 following	a	transfer	of	
the	 SEPs.	 	 Kühn	 et	 al.	 (2013),	 NRC	 (2013),	 Kesan	 and	 Hayes	 (2014),	 Contreras	
(2015c),	CRA	(2016).	
	
	 In	 some	 cases,	 SSO	 participants	 have	 transferred	 SEPs	 to	 patent	 assertion	
entities	 (PAEs)	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 monetization	 and	 assertion	 (this	 practice	 is	
sometimes	 referred	 to	 as	 “privateering”).	 Lundqvist	 (2014),	 Golden	 (2013).	 JRC	
(2016)	 found	 that	approximately	80%	of	patents	asserted	by	PAEs	were	obtained	
from	operating	companies.	 In	one	recent	case,	a	product	manufacturer	has	alleged	
that	 a	 SEP	 holder	 conspired	 with	 a	 number	 of	 PAEs	 in	 violation	 of	 its	 FRAND	











scholars	 have	 attempted	 to	 address	 multiple	 forms	 of	 intellectual	 property	
protection	 for	 standards.	 De	 Carvalho	 (2015)	 offers	 a	 holistic	 view	 of	 patents,	
copyrights	 and	 trademarks	 on	 standards	within	 an	 international	 competition	 law	





	 Because	most	 technical	 standards	 take	 the	 form	of	written	documents,	 it	 is	
generally	 understood	 that	 they	 are	 considered	 copyrightable	works	 of	 authorship	
and	protected	by	copyright	law.42		While	various	individuals	and	firms	make	textual	
and	 other	 contributions	 to	 standards,	 the	 relevant	 SSO	 often	 claims	 ownership	 of	
the	 collective	work	 embodied	 in	 a	 published	 standard.	 	While	 several	 SSOs	make	
their	standards	 freely	available	 to	 the	public	via	 the	 Internet,	others	exercise	 tight	
control	 over	 their	 published	 standards,	 often	 charging	 for	 access	 and	 prohibiting	
copying	and	distribution.		
	
	 	 1.	 Incorporation	 by	 Reference.	 The	 control	 exercised	 by	 some	
SSOs	over	standards	documents	has	become	controversial	with	respect	to	standards	
that	 have	 been	 incorporated	 by	 governmental	 agencies	 into	 legislation	 and	
regulation.	 	Such	 incorporation	by	reference	(IBR)	 frequently	occurs	 in	the	case	of	
local	 building,	 safety	 and	 electrical	 codes,	 which	 often	 reference	 and	 incorporate	
standards	developed	within	SSOs.		Mendelson	(2015)	estimates	that	there	are	more	
than	 9,000	 of	 these	 IBR	 standards	 within	 various	 federal	 regulatory	 codes	 and	
agency	 rules.	 Bremer	 (2015)	 collects	 data	 regarding	 the	 pricing	 of	 various	 IBR	
standards.	
	
	 A	 circuit	 split	 currently	 exists	 in	 the	 U.S.	 courts	 regarding	 the	 copyright	
status	 of	 standards	 that	 have	 been	 incorporated	 into	 law	 (Practice	 Management	
(1998),	Veeck	(2002)).		Nevertheless,	in	2012	a	petition	was	filed	with	the	Office	of	
the	 Federal	 Register	 seeking	 a	 rule	 that	 technical	 standards	 referenced	 in	 federal	
regulations	 be	made	 freely	 available	 via	 the	 Internet.	 	 Strauss	 (2013).	 In	 2012,	 a	
public	 interest	 group	 began	 to	 reproduce	 IBR	 standards	 and	 make	 them	 freely	
available	 online,	 leading	 to copyright infringement suits by several SDOs	 (Strauss	
(2013),	Bremer	(2015)).		In	an	effort	to	mediate	this	dispute,	ANSI	has	established	a	
controlled-access	(read	only)	online	portal	for	IBR	standards.	ANSI	(2014),	Bremer	
(2015).	 Other	 proposals	 have	 been	 made,	 including	 hosting	 of	 IBR	 standards	 by	
federally-controlled	web	sites	(Mendelson	(2015)).	
	
	 	 2.	 Software	 in	 Standards.	 	 Some	 technical	 standards	 include	
software	code	that	must	be	implemented	in	products	in	order	for	them	to	conform	
to	the	standard.	Other	standards	include	reference	or	exemplary	software	code	that	
illustrates	 the	 means	 by	 which	 the	 standard	 may	 be	 implemented	 in	 software.		
																																																								
42 Samuelson (2007) challenges this assumption arguing, among other things, that standards documents 




raise	 issues	 relating	 to	 the	 ownership	 and	 licensing	 of	 copyrights.	 Conflicts	 over	





in	open	source	code	products,	which	often	 impose	 their	own	demanding	 licensing	
conditions.	Vetter	(2007),	Updegrove	(2009).		Lundell	et	al.	(2015)	studied	the	effect	
of	ISO’s	use	conditions,	as	well	as	filed	patent	disclosures,	on	the	implementation	of	











	 The	names	 and	designations	 of	 standards	 that	 are	widely	 adopted,	 such	 as	
Bluetooth,	Blu-ray	and	USB,	can	acquire	substantial	market	value.	SSOs	often	retain	
ownership	 of	 these	 trademarks	 and	 license	 their	 use	 in	 connection	with	 products	
conforming	to	the	standard.	In	some	cases,	a	standard	or	series	of	standards	may	be	
associated	with	a	mark	not	originated	by	 the	SSO,	 such	as	 the	well-known	Wi-Fi®	




conformity	 to	 different	 standards.	 Barnett	 (2012)	 discusses	 certification	 markets	




“UL”	 certification	 for	 electrical	 products	 and	 the	 Green	 Building	 Council’s	 “LEED”	
certification	for	new	buildings.		
	
	 The	 proliferation	 of	 certification	 marks	 on	 certain	 categories	 of	 products,	
especially	 “green”	 or	 “eco-friendly”	 products,	 has	 been	 cataloged	 and	 critiqued	by	
Chon	(2009)	and	Contreras	and	McManis	(2013).	Fischer	and	Lyon	(2014)	compare	
environmental	 certification	 labels	 developed	 by	 non-governmental	 organizations	
versus	 industry	 bodies.	 However,	 little	 empirical	 literature	 exists	 regarding	 the	
																																																								
43 The Wi-Fi® trademark is controlled by Wi-Fi Alliance, a non-profit organization formed in 1999 and 












on	 the	 acquisition	 and	 disclosure	 of	 patents	 within	 SSOs,	 particularly	 in	 the	 ICT	
sector.	 	 Several	 important	 catalogs	 and	 analyses	 of	 SSO	patent	 policies	 now	 exist,	
together	with	rich	databases	of	SSO	membership	and	policy	data.	
	
	 Despite	 this	 large	 body	 of	 literature,	 there	 are	 numerous	 areas	 at	 the	
confluence	 of	 intellectual	 property	 and	 standardization	 that	 warrant	 further	
investigation.	 	 These	 include:	 the	 influence	 and	 internal	 organization	 of	 consortia	
and	other	 informal	standards	groups;	the	prevalence	and	market	 impact	of	de	jure	
and	 de	 facto	 royalty-free	 standards;	 the	 effect	 of	 patents	 on	 standardization	 in	
growing	 fields	 outside	 of	 ICT	 including	 clean	 technology,	 medical	 devices	 and	
automotive	infrastructure;	the	interaction	of	technology	standards	with	open	source	
software;	the	impact	of	product	certification	and	certification	marks	on	technology	
products	 and	 markets;	 and	 the	 institutional,	 legal	 and	 policy	 landscape	 of	
standardization	 outside	 of	 North	 America	 and	 Europe,	 particularly	 in	 China	 and	
other	Asian	economies.			
	
	 In	 addition,	 more	 public	 data	 is	 needed	 regarding	 patent	 licensing	 and	
royalty	rates	for	standardized	technologies.		The	data	that	currently	exists	is	gleaned	




and	 beyond	 the	 reach	 of	 researchers,	 policy	 makers,	 enforcement	 agencies	 and	
courts.	 	 Greater	 public	 access	 to	 this	 data	 has	 the	 potential	 to	 lower	 licensing	
transaction	 costs,	 reduce	 the	 number	 of	 disputes	 regarding	 FRAND	 royalty	 rates,	
improve	 the	 accuracy	 of	 judicial	 damages	 determinations,	 inform	 agency	
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